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INTRODUCTION 
 Recently, options backdating has come to the forefront of corporate America's scandals.  
Questions over executive compensation in the form of stock options have sparked local and 
federal investigations from a number of agencies.  Over 120 companies have come under 
scrutiny for their stock option granting practices.  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) are investigating whether companies 
backdated stock options for employees, retroactively changing the date an option grant became 
effective to a date that created a bigger windfall for those who held the options. 
The consequences of a backdating inquiry are great.  Some organizations are faced with 
federal criminal charges, civil penalties and fines.  A number of top executives at various 
organizations have been fired and others have resigned.  Many organizations face accounting and 
tax problems that may cost substantial sums of money to both investigate and correct.  Some 
businesses are faced with restating financial results going back several years.   
 Although it has recently come into the spotlight, options backdating has arguably been in 
existence for many years.  It was not until academic studies began to note backdating's 
widespread use that the practice came under scrutiny.  Many organizations and agencies have 
reacted in an attempt to stop the practice of undisclosed options backdating, both through a focus 
on enforcement of new guidelines and disclosure rules as well as through structural reforms 
beginning with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  However, additional academic studies have 
noted that the practice still exists. 
As the government, investors and the organizations themselves demand accuracy and 
disclosure, the question remains what is the fair, just, and most effective resolution for 
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companies and individuals caught up in this problem, will this practice stop, and who will 
ultimately pay the price for illegal backdating of options?   
This paper will set forth a two-prong solution to limit the future implications of both 
options backdating as well as similar corporate frauds.  The first prong entails forcefully 
pursuing punishment of illegalities in order to create a strong deterrent effect.  At this initial 
stage of the investigations into previous illegal options backdating, the justice system is not 
doing enough to create a deterrent effect.  In order to create the reform that the practice of 
options backdating requires, blame must be assessed on everyone who participated in the illegal 
actions.  If some culpable members of an organization are able to escape liability, the deterrent 
effect is reduced.  Although top executives are the only ones being held liable at this stage, 
accountability should be extended to company attorneys and auditors, compensation committees, 
boards of directors, and, perhaps, the company itself.   
The second prong requires the creation of a uniform scheme for option granting going 
forward.  By requiring organizations to set options grants to occur on the same date each year, 
enforcement agencies and the public are able to more effectively monitor the grant process for 
potential illegalities.  This ability to monitor the process will ensure that violations such as this 
do not occur in the future.  Additionally, by streamlining the process, automatic penalties would 
be feasible, making punishment easier and more efficient, adding to the deterrent effect.  This 
two-prong solution of deterrence and effective regulation will create a system where potential 
violators have limited opportunity to violate the law and where they fear the potential 
consequences of any possible violations.  
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I. HISTORY 
A. What is options backdating? 
1.  Definition  
 The intended result of the customary practice in issuing options is that the options have 
value only if, after the grant, the market value of those shares has increased.  Therefore, options 
serve as a form of incentive compensation but not as a form of immediate remuneration.1  
Options backdating is the practice of marking a document with a date that precedes the actual 
date.  Typical stock options give the holder (the receiver of the option) the right to purchase a 
share of stock at a predetermined price, the "exercise price."2  The exercise price is typically the 
closing price of the company's stock on the date that the company grants the option. Thus, on the 
grant date, the option shares typically have the same value as the shares that are trading that day, 
it has no intrinsic value.  The option's lack of intrinsic value is deemed to be "at the money."3   
Generally, in authorizing a stock option, a company first adopts a stock option plan, 
which requires a vote of approval by shareholders.  Next, the board of directors typically assigns 
the administration of the plan to the compensation committee.  This committee officially 
determines the size and timing of stock option grants.4  The stock option's exercise price is 
"usually the stock's 4 p.m. [eastern time] price on the date of the grant, an average of the day's 
                                                 
1 Option and Other Equity Grant Practices, WEIL BRIEFING: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Weil, Gotshal & Manges 
LLP, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 23, 2007, at 2, 
http://www.knowledgemosaic.com/gateway/memo/Weil%20Briefing%20-%2023%20Feb%2007%20-
%20att%202.pdf [hereinafter WEIL BRIEFING].  
2 Spencer C. Barasch et al., Stock Option Scandal, 22 TX LAWYER 1, 1 (Dec. 25, 2006) 
http://www.infominder.com/webminder/RD.jsp?a=1&aref=m3z1ow0ij.  
3 Id.  
4 5 Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 Mgmt. Sci. 802, 803 (May 2005), available at 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/Grants-MS.pdf. 
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high and low, or the 4 p.m. price the day before [the grant]."5  If the committee does not award 
options on the same date every year they are considered unscheduled.  It is with these 
unscheduled options awards that executives or other officials might time the awards to have been 
"granted" on a date when the stock prices had been particularly low.6  By timing an option to 
reflect a stock price that is lower than the market price on the actual date of the grant, the 
company is providing the grantee with an "in the money" benefit; the option has intrinsic value 
on the date the grantee receives it.  
 Options backdating is frequently related to another form of potentially fraudulent options 
granting, "spring loading."  Spring loading is different in that it is forward looking in strategy (as 
opposed to looking back to find a low grant price).  In spring loading, a company times its option 
grants so that they occur just before a good news announcement of which the investing public is 
not aware.  Spring loaded options result in an exercise price that reflects the low stock price 
before the announcement and ends up immediately in the money following the stock price 
increase from the good news announcement. 
 Options backdating is also compared to "bullet dodging."  Bullet dodging involves setting 
an option grant date later than the approval date so that information that is expected to cause a 
decrease in the market value of the company's shares can be disclosed, resulting in an exercise 
price that reflects the market's reaction to the information.7 
2.  What are the "benefits" of options backdating?   
The recent stock option backdating "scandal" centers around the efforts by executives and 
officials of numerous companies to grant options to employees with exercise prices below the 
                                                 
5 Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday - Some CEOs Reap Millions by Landing Stock Options 
When They Are Most Valuable; Luck - or Something Else?, WALL ST. J.,  March 18, 2006, available at 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/wsj2.htm [hereinafter Forelle & Bandler, CEOs Reap Millions]. 
6 5 Lie, supra note 4, at 804.  
7 WEIL BRIEFING, supra note 1, at 2.  
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closing price of the company's stock on the actual grant date.8  This can be accomplished by 
backdating (selecting an earlier past date) or forging corporate documents and financial 
statements to make it appear that the company granted the option on a date when its stock price 
was lower than on the true grant date.9  By selecting a date in which the stock had a lower dollar 
value the option has an intrinsic value on the date that it is granted.10  It is an in the money 
option.  Executive Stock Options (ESOs) are usually granted at the money.  Because the option 
value is higher if the exercise price is lower, executives obviously prefer to be granted options 
when the stock price is at its lowest.  Backdating inflates the value of the options.11  
An example illustrates the impact of backdating: The board of ABC Corporation adopts a 
stock option plan after shareholder approval.  The compensation committee later elects to issue 
1,000 options to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) on December 1st.  The closing price for 
ABC's stock on December 1st was $100.  A company executive notes that the closing price on 
November 6th was only $75.  The executive decides to alter company records to "grant" the 
options on November 6th.  This fraud results in an in the money benefit of $25 per share 
granted.12 
The backdating of options to executives defeats the purpose of these grants. The point of 
stock options is that the executive only benefits if the stock goes up, tying executive 
compensation to that of the company and its performance.  When the grants are fixed to provide 
                                                 
8 Barasch et al., supra note 2, at 1. 
9 Id.   
10 Options Dating Issues, SIMPSON THACHER REPORT (Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett), June 22, 2006, at 1, 
http://www.stblaw.com/content/publications/pub556.pdf.  
11 Erik Lie, Backdating of Executive Stock Option (ESO) Grants, Jan. 15, 2006, 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/backdating.htm [hereinafter Lie, Backdating of ESO Grants].  
12 See, e.g., Mark Maremont, Authorities Probe Improper Backdating of Options – Practice Allows Executives to 
Bolster Their Stock Gains; A Highly Beneficial Pattern, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2005, available at 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/wsj1.htm (Noting a CEO option grant dated October 1998.  The number of 
shares subject to option was 250,000 and the exercise price was $30.  Given a year-end price of $85, the intrinsic 
value of the options at the end of the year was ($85-$30) x 250,000 = $13,750,000.  In comparison, had the options 
been granted at the year-end price when the decision to grant to options actually might have been made, the year-end 
intrinsic value would have been zero).  
 6
an immediate profit, this risk is largely eliminated.  In a June 8, 2006 speech, SEC Chairman 
Cox stated that backdating is "antithetical to the presumptive purpose of stock options – to 
provide a 'powerful motivational tool' to promote future performance."13  Cox acknowledged that 
stock options can be positive incentives for employees and that "the proper use of stock options 
in compensation can make a very positive contribution to our economy by offering significant 
future rewards."14 He further stated in his June speech that the immediate effect of backdating 
"cuts the direct connection to future performance" and criticized the effect that undisclosed 
backdating has on shareholders' right to knowledge of executive level compensation.15  
3. This is not a new phenomenon 
In the academic study that brought to light much of the practice of backdating, Dr. Erik 
Lie, Associate Professor and Research Fellow at the University of Iowa's Henry B. Tippie 
College of Business, estimated that ten percent of all option grants made prior to 2002 may have 
been backdated.16  Others have alleged that the number of companies involved may have been 
around 2,000.17 
It is said that options to buy shares at a preset "strike" price, a point at which recipients 
can convert them to shares, "became a widespread form of compensation during the 1990's 
boom, especially at technology firms.  Along the way they attracted controversy, in part because 
                                                 
13 Backdating Stock Options Controversy Heats Up: The Brocade Case and its Implications for the Future, DEWEY 
BALLANTINE REPORT (Dewey Ballantine LLP), July 28 2006, at 4, 
http://www.deweyballantine.com/docs/publications/2043.pdf?u=%22Backdated%20Stock%20Options%20Controve
rsy%20Heats%20Up%3A%20The%20Brocade%20Case%20and%20its%20Implications%20for%20the%20Future
%22. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Comm'n, Address to the New York Financial 
Writers Association (June 8, 2006) at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch060806cc.htm [hereinafter Cox, 
Address to NY Financial Writers Ass'n].    
14 DEWEY BALLANTINE LLP, supra note 13, at 4.  See Cox, Address to NY Financial Writers Ass'n, supra note 13. 
15 Id. 
16 Legal News: Transactional and Securities Update, INFO. BULLETIN (Foley & Lardner LLP), Aug. 15, 2006, at 1, 
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/3533/LegalNews%20TS%208-15-06.pdf 
17 An Option to Steal?, THE WEEK, Dec. 29, 2006 – Jan. 12, 2007, at 47 [hereinafter THE WEEK]. 
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some executives made huge fortunes off them as their stock prices soared."18  David Yermack of 
New York University was the first researcher to document some unusual stock price patterns 
around executive grants.  Yermack found, in his 1997 study published in the Journal of Finance, 
that stock prices tend to increase shortly after the grants and attributed this pattern to grant 
timing, whereby executives would be granted options before predicted price increases.19  Thus, 
Yermack did not opine that the executives might be backdating, rather he believed that a spring 
loading type theory existed.   
A number of companies have been alleged to be involved in past backdating practices.  
The caliber of some of these organizations is an example of the scope of how far the practice of 
backdating may have reached.  Large, recognizable companies have been under investigation, 
including Microsoft, Home Depot, Barnes & Noble, Gap, Intuit, Apple Computers, Michaels 
Stores, and Monster Worldwide.20  For example, Mercury Interactive Corporation's stock price 
pattern shows that it chose low points for every major grant from 1996 to 2002.  Mercury gave 
1.3 million options to executives on March 31, 1997.  Its stock had fallen 21% during the ten 
prior trading days and rose 22% in the ten days afterward.  Similarly, on January 6, 2000, 
executives were given 1.2 million new options after the stock had dropped 20% during the 
previous ten trading days and rose 56% in the ten trading days afterward, creating a gain of $27 
million for the recipients.21  
The Corporate Library, an entity that monitors corporate governance, notes that "the 
practice of illegal backdating likely spread through networks of directors and executives serving 
                                                 
18 Maremont, supra note 12. 
19 Lie, Backdating of ESO Grants, supra note 11.  
20 FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 16, at 1.  See also Perfect Payday: Options Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Updated 
Feb. 20, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html 
[hereinafter Options Scorecard] (List of companies that have disclosed government probes, misdated options, 
restatements and/or executive departures).  
21 Lie, Backdating of ESO Grants, supra note 11. 
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on multiple boards of directors."22  The return patterns around options awards intensified over 
time, "suggesting that executives ... gradually learned how to better time awards to their 
advantage or become more aggressive in their timing efforts."23 
 4. Why is options backdating a concern now?  
 A number of contributing factors have created the attention that now surrounds options 
backdating.  Options backdating has become a major issue at a time of rising shareholder 
attention to high executive compensation.24  Yet the main cause for the recent attention stems 
from the publication of a study conducted by Dr. Erik Lie which suggests that backdating may be 
the main cause for the abnormal rise in the value of options granted to many corporate 
executives.25 
Lie's study documented that stock returns are negative before unscheduled executive 
option awards and positive afterward.  Lie postulated that "[u]nless executives possess an 
extraordinary ability to forecast the future market-wide movements that drive these predicted 
returns, the results suggest that at least some of the awards are timed retroactively."26  Lie noted 
that stock prices (after adjustment for market effects) started to decline more than a month before 
the award. However, there was a sharp reversal of the price trend on the award dates; 
immediately after the awards, the prices tended to increase.27  
                                                 
22 Mary-Laura Greely & Pamela Greene, Options Backdating: Why the Fuss and How to Avoid it, BOSTON WOMEN'S 
BUS., Feb. 2007, at 2, available at http://www.mintz.com/images/dyn/publications/MLPG.pdf.  
23 5 Lie, supra note 4, at 810.  
24 Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Backdating Probe Widens as Two Quit Silicon Valley Firm – Power 
Integrations Officials Leave Amid Options Scandal; 10 Companies Involved So Far, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2006, 
available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/wsj3.htm [hereinafter Forelle & Bandler, Backdating Probe 
Widens].  See also 5 Lie, supra note 4, at 810.  
25 FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 16, at 1. 
26 5 Lie, supra note 4, at 802 (Lie's sample consisted of 5,977 CEO stock option awards from 1992 through 2002, 
1,668 of which had "sufficient information to be classified as unscheduled and 1,426 as scheduled"). 
27 5 Lie, supra note 4, at 805.  See also Options Backdating – The Controversy Continues, BLANK ROME UPDATE 
(Blank Rome LLP), Sept. 2006, at http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=1015 (noting the 
appearance of impropriety that some companies have faced due to this statistical examination of options that 
demonstrate a "pattern of (a) granting options at the lowest stock  price during a period or (b) the price of the 
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Lie went on to compare his results with previous studies.  He examined whether the 
options trends changed over time.  His results found that the unusual return trends did increase 
with time.28   Lie noted that this either suggested that "executives [were] getting better or more 
aggressive at opportunistically timing awards during the sample period."29  Lie discredited the 
possibility that the stock pattern was "attributable to executives timing awards relative to 
expected future price patterns, [because then] their collective ability to forecast future price 
movements based on inside information [would be] striking."30  He went on to note that 
"retroactive timing obviously requires little skill, although outsiders might perceive it to be 
fraudulent.  In any event, it is unlikely that outsiders would ever learn of it, because the company 
does not publicly report the grant date until months thereafter."31  It is this difficulty in 
discovering such fraud that may have prevented it from earlier discovery.  Further, Lie's study 
had different results because during earlier studies, fewer companies had been backdating.  It 
was a growing trend as it spread from directors of one corporation to directors of others. 
Lie's paper has "[shaken] corporate America and set in motion a series of investigations 
and press reports that exposed a practice that few had thought much about."32  The study in the 
paper looked at thousands of option grants.  Lie found a "pattern of stocks dipping sharply just 
before the date of option grants, then rising immediately afterward – even after adjusting for 
overall market returns."33  Additionally, Lie found market prices as a whole tended to rise after 
                                                                                                                                                             
company's stock spiking shortly after the grant date of options."  Because it is "statistically unlikely that companies 
could consistently 'pick' these dates at random, thereby calling into question the company's actual practices.")  
28 5 Lie, supra note 4, at 803.  
29 Id. (noting that executives might have become more effective in timing the awards to their advantage). 
30 Id. (Lie did note that it was not impossible that insiders may be able to predict future short-term market-wide 
movements, explaining some of his results).  
31 Id. at 803, 806.  
32 THE WEEK, supra note 17, at 47.   
33 Maremont, supra note 12. See also 5 Lie, supra note 4, at 810. 
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grants, which he suggested "shows that executives may have backdated options, already knowing 
how the market moved."34 
Since The Wall Street Journal's March 18, 2006 front page story on backdating, based on 
Lie's study and paper, there have been numerous disclosures by public companies under 
investigation by the SEC, the DOJ, or both.35   In the past year "over 200 companies, including 
some of the best known and most successful, have reported that they have commenced internal 
reviews of their option grant practices."36  Many of these reviews have found that option grants 
were in fact misdated.  
An additional reason why the options backdating scandal has garnered so much attention 
is that it has become the "new focus of the federal government's corporate fraud initiative, which 
was launched in July 2002 amid the accounting fraud scandals involving Enron, Adelphia, 
WorldCom and other major corporations, and was followed ... by the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act."37  With the accounting fraud investigations nearing completion after the convictions 
of various former CEO's, the backdating options issue has "provided a vehicle for the federal 
government to publicize its continuing corporate fraud enforcement campaign."38  The highly 
publicized charges currently being brought against various companies "demonstrate the 
government's effort to send a forceful message that it will proceed aggressively."39 
B.  Is options backdating illegal? 
Issuing stock options with an exercise price less than the market price of the shares on the 
date of grant is not inherently improper or illegal so long as the issuance complies with the terms 
                                                 
34 Id.  
35 DEWEY BALLANTINE LLP, supra note 13, at 2.  
36 WEIL BRIEFING, supra note 1, at 2.  
37 DEWEY BALLANTINE LLP, supra note 13, at 2. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
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of the stock option plan that the shareholders approved and the issuance is properly approved, 
disclosed, accounted for, and the appropriate tax treatment for such options is applied.40  SEC 
Commissioner Paul S. Atkins remarked that "the mere fact that options were backdated does not 
mean that the securities laws were violated ... [T]here is no securities law issue if backdating 
results from an administrative, paperwork delay.  A board, for example, might approve an option 
grant over the telephone, but the board members' signatures may take a few days to trickle in. 
One could argue that the grant date is the date on which the last director signed, but this 
argument does not necessarily reflect standard corporate practice or the logistical practicalities of 
getting many geographically dispersed and busy, part-time people to sign a document.  It also 
ignores that these actions reflect a true meeting of the minds of the directors, memorialized by 
executing a unanimous written consent."41    
1.  Backdating options is not always illegal  
Stock option grants that are backdated are not illegal so long as a number of conditions 
are met.  The most important condition is that no documents in connection with the grant have 
been forged.  The acceptance by the company of a backdating scheme (and when it may be 
applied) must be clearly communicated to the organization's shareholders.  Any backdating must 
be properly reflected in earnings.  Neglecting to account for an in the money option leads to an 
illegal artificially inflated earnings statement for the company.  "For example, because 
backdating is used to choose a grant date with a lower price than on the actual decision date, the 
options are effectively in the money on the decision date, and the reported earnings should be 
                                                 
40  WEIL BRIEFING, supra note 1.   
41 46 Stephen J. Crimmins, Sorting Out the Option Backdating Cases, 38 SEC. REGULATION & LAW REPORT, Nov. 
20, 2006, 1955, 1958, available at http://www.mayerbrownrowe.com/publications/article.asp?id=3135&nid=6 
(quoting remarks of Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Comm'n, Address (July 6, 2006) at 
www.sec.gov/news/speech).   
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reduced for the fiscal year of the grant."42  Additionally, backdating must be properly reflected in 
taxes.43  If all of these conditions are met it is likely that the backdating would be legal.  
However, there is little reason for backdating options in these situations, because the firm can 
grant bonuses or in the money options instead. 
Whether or not a company allows the backdating of options can be questionable in and of 
itself, leading to inadvertent or undiscovered violations.  Standard legal documents relating to 
stock option plans generally do not specify whether a grant date can be set retroactively.44  Stock 
option documents are often "vague as to how the grant date should be determined, and do not 
specifically prohibit the grant date from preceding the decision date."45  Additionally, it was 
difficult for "outsiders" to uncover any illegal practices as individual option agreements were 
often not publicly disclosed.46 
Some specific situations create questions as to whether or not a company has done 
something illegal in issuing options.  One such situation occurs when the compensation 
committee decides to grant an option on a certain date, but the corporate formalities, such as 
board of director consents, are not completed until a later date when the stock price has 
increased.47  There is "usually no intent to deceive in these situations but even an inadvertent 
                                                 
42 Lie, Backdating of ESO Grants, supra note 11 ("Under ... the accounting rule that was in effect until 2005, firms 
did not have to expense options at all unless they were in-the-money. However, under the new FAS 123R, the 
expense is based on the fair market value on the grant date, such that even at-the-money options have to be 
expensed"). 
43 Id. ("The exercise price affects the basis that is used for estimating both the company's compensation expense for 
tax purposes and any capital gain for the option recipient.  Thus, an artificially low exercise price might alter the tax 
payments for both the company and the option recipient.  Further, at the money options are considered performance-
based compensation, and can therefore be deducted for tax purposes...however...in the money [options] ... might not 
qualify for such tax deductions.") 
44 5 Lie, supra note 4, at 803. 
45 Id. at 804, 807 ("...stock option plans that [Lie] looked at do not explicitly prohibit such activities. The plans 
generally state that the exercise price should be the market price at the grant date, but does not state that the grant 
date cannot precede the decision date"). 
46 Id. 
47 Stock Options: Backdating and Other Issues Involving Stock Option Grants: New Rules from the SEC and a Game 
Plan for Avoiding Liability, K&LNG ALERT (Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP), July 2006, at 2-3, at 
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delay in the approval process can have adverse consequences."48  In these situations, "the 
company may be able to argue that any [past incident of] misdating was merely a mistake."49  
However, such a claim may not be sufficient to avoid tax, accounting and other issues.50  
Another questionable situation is when stock options were awarded to an employee on a date 
before the employee actually began employment with the organization.51  In such situations the 
question in avoiding liability is whether such a procedure was permitted by the company's option 
plan and procedures.52 
  Unfortunately, the conditions to ensure that the backdating of options is not in violation 
of the law were infrequently met in the organizations now under investigation by various 
agencies, making the backdating of such option grants illegal in most cases.   
2. When backdating options is illegal   
The options that have prompted concern from the government, shareholders and the 
media are those in which the exercise price of a stock option grant made by a company to its 
executives and other employees may have been set at below-market prices, contrary to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/6c4d05a2-a093-4bd0-9ce6-
f2008a60b5ac/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2d0a911e-5821-4b41-bf30-01db96f4ec21/SOA0706.pdf ("This 
may occur, for example, if a unanimous consent is not signed by all directors or committee members until a later 
date when the stock price is higher (the laws of many states provide that a unanimous consent is not effective until 
the last director signs it."  Additionally, companies using this approach sometimes "fail to develop adequate 
procedures for contemporaneously documenting the grant decisions made by the [compensation] committee").  
48 Id.  
49 SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, supra note 10, at 2.  
50 Id. 
51 KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART NICHOLSON GRAHAM LLP, supra note 47, at 2-3 (Some organizations have granted 
options to new hires as of a date prior to the new employee's first day of employment.  For example, "an 
employment offer letter issued pre-employment may promise a prospective employee an option grant at the then 
prevailing market price"). 
52 SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, supra note 10, at 2. See also 8 Mark Tarallo & Ted Hanselman, All You Wanted 
to Know About Back Dating of Options but Were Afraid to Ask, 14 THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL 1 
(Aug. 2006) available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/August/07.pdf ("For new hires, some 
companies may have listed an employee's start date as earlier than the actual start date in order to take advantage of 
a low stock price").   
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company's stated practice of only issuing options with an exercise price equal to the market price 
on the date of grant.53  Such a practice would be illegal.   
Various practices may violate laws or regulations.  If the terms of an option plan prohibit 
grants at less than fair market value, a company that issues such may face claims of breach of 
fiduciary duty and corporate waste.54  If anyone in the organization "purposefully falsified or 
manipulated documents in an effort to hide the backdating practice" the company and the 
individual may be subject to both criminal and civil liability.55  For example, a company may 
report in its public documents that the strike prices for options are always equal to the market 
value on the date of a grant but then choose a different date. This could constitute a securities-
fraud violation for misleading disclosures.56  If the granted options did not receive the requisite 
approvals by the appropriate members of the company, those issuing the grants could face 
"allegations of self-dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, failure of internal controls, and/or corporate 
waste."57  
There are also possible repercussions if an organization that engaged in backdating 
violated accounting rules by failing to include as an expense the extra compensation created by 
discounted stock options.58  There were different accounting rules in effect at the time of the 
grants now under scrutiny.  Under these, if the option price was set below the fair market value 
of the stock on the date granted, "the company was required to take a charge to earnings in its 
financial statements to account for this in the money grant."59  Failure to disclose backdating and 
                                                 
53  WEIL BRIEFING, supra note 1, at 1. 
54 SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, supra note 10, at 1-2. 
55 Id.  E.g. KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART NICHOLSON GRAHAM LLP, supra note 47, at 2-3.  
56 Maremont, supra note 12. 
57 SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, supra note 10, at 1.  
58 Maremont, supra note 12. 
59 Greely & Greene, supra note 22, at 1 (This changed with recent accounting rule changes). Accord Forelle & 
Bandler, Backdating Probe Widens, supra note 24.  
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recognize adverse tax and accounting consequences can also result in a number of legal 
consequences.60 
In general, "recent evidence suggests that the SEC has adopted the view that backdating 
violates securities laws and constitutes financial fraud when firms fail to record as compensation 
expense the amount by which the option grants were actually in the money at the time the grant 
decision was made."61 
3.  If backdating could be considered illegal, why do it?  
There are a number of reasons why various organizations engaged in questionable 
options backdating procedures.  The question arises of why a compensation committee would not 
instead award more options or provide an additional bonus?  There are a number of reasons.   
However, those in favor of such claim that the "need for incentives such as discounted 
stock options to retain and recruit valuable employees in a competitive environment. 
Additionally, they argue that issuing discounted options is just a compensation decision and does 
not involve the actual payment of company cash or a guarantee that the option will be in the 
money upon ultimate vesting."62  Supporters have argued "[n]othing can be more frustrating than 
issuing options to an employee with the intent of rewarding the employee only to have the price 
of the shares drop after the issuance, rendering the options of little value.  The company could 
reissue or reprice the options, but there is a price for doing this, including reporting costs and a 
                                                 
60 Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around Executive Stock Option 
Grants? Forthcoming, J. OF FIN. ECON. 1, at 8 available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/Grants-JFE.pdf 
[hereinafter Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain] ("Most stock options are non-qualified stock options, in which 
case the tax implications arise when the options are exercised.  At this time, the executive is taxed at their ordinary 
income tax rate on the spread between the current market price and the exercise price....The corporation records a 
compensation expense deduction for tax purposes in the amount of the difference between the market price at 
exercise and the option's exercise price. Because opportunistic backdating of option grant dates results in lower 
exercise prices for option grants, it reduces corporate taxes... Tax consequences of backdating non-qualified stock 
option grant dates would effectively net out to zero, as the additional taxes paid by the executive would be offset by 
the reduced taxes at the corporate level."). 
61 Id. 
62 FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 16, at 2.  
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potentially negative impact on the issuer’s financial statements."63  Often, the company's stock 
option plan limits the number of options that can be awarded so issuance of "corrected" options 
is not possible. Additionally, "stockholders dislike the potential dilutive effect generated by a 
large number of outstanding options."64  
Additional advantages of backdating over other possible incentives are gained in the 
accounting arena.  Under older accounting principles, a company that granted options at a 
purchase price equal to the price of its stock underlying the option on the date of grant did not 
have to state such as an expense on the company’s financial statements.  This made option 
compensation, unlike salary or a cash bonus which had to be accounted for, an accounting 
advantage.65   
C. Options backdating legal issues after Sarbanes-Oxley 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) went into effect on August 29, 2002 and effectively 
changed a company's ability to engage in questionable backdating practices.66  Until the passage 
of SOX, companies did not have to report option grants until months later.  Some organizations 
had time to look at the "company's stock price performance ... to determine the stock's low point 
and designate that date as the retroactive stock option grant date."67  SOX changed reporting 
requirements, effectively forcing organizations to report grants within two days, thus leaving 
"less leeway to retroactively date a grant."68  
                                                 
63 Tarallo & Hanselman, supra note 52, at 1.  
64 5 Lie, supra note 4, at 804.  
65 Greely & Greene, supra note 22, at 1 (this changed with recent accounting rule changes). 
66 FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 16, at 2. E.g., Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain, supra note 60, at 2 
("Effective August 29, 2002, and in response to changes to Section 16 reporting of the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934 mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC changed the reporting regulations for stock option grants"). 
67 FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 16, at 2.  
68 5 Lie, supra note 4, at 805 n.3.  Accord Tracy Nichols, Beyond back-dating: Think your option concerns are in the 
past? Now it's time to deal with the tax experts, DAILY BUS. REV., Jan. 18, 2007, at 1-2, available at 
http://www.hklaw.com/content/whitepapers/SpecialReportSecuritiesLawBeyondBackDating.pdf. See e.g., BLANK 
ROME LLP, supra note 27.   
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 A second study by Professor Erik Lie estimated that over 2,000 companies (29.2% of a 
total sample of 7,774 companies) manipulated grants to top executives between 1996 and 2002, 
before SOX.69  This study showed that the patterns that indicated backdating sharply declined 
after August 2002, when SOX rules began requiring executives to report option grants within 
two days, instead of months later as previously allowed. "With less leeway to choose a favorable 
grant date most of the effect disappeared."70  Before August 2002, employees receiving stock 
option grants were: 
... required to report them to the SEC on Form 5, which was not due until 45 days 
after the company’s fiscal year end and also to stockholders in the proxy 
statement for the following year’s annual stockholder meeting. [F]ollowing the 
legislative change, stock option grant recipients must report them to the SEC on 
Form 4, and must do so within two business days of receiving the grant.  The SEC 
makes this information available to the public one day after it receives the 
information.  Firms with corporate websites are also now required to make the 
option grant information available on their website on the day following when 
they disclose the information to the SEC....the ability to backdate option grants to 
coincide with days with low stock prices is greatly diminished.71 
 
However, while Professor Lie's second study found that the return pattern after the new 
reporting requirements was weaker, it was still present.72  Lie notes "it is possible that the two 
day lag between the grant date and the reporting date still gives some leeway to opportunistically 
backdate grants.  Further, to the extent that executives don't comply with the reporting 
requirements, they can still backdate the grants."73   
                                                 
69 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1958 (citing Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain, supra note 60, at 4, 29 (the 
study compared a sample of 3,735 stock option grants to CEOs between August 29, 2002 and November 30, 2004 to 
the return pattern discovered in Lie's earlier study which included a sample from January 1, 2000 through August 
28, 2002.  It found "the abnormal return pattern is much more pronounced for the earlier period.")) 
70 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1958.  
71 Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain, supra note 60, at 2-3. But see FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 16, at 
2 (noting "nearly 20 percent of executives are filing their Form 4s up to two to four weeks late"). 
72 Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain, supra note 60, at 4.  See generally William Meade Fletcher, FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPS., FLETCHER-CYC § 3:109 (Sept. 2006).  
73 Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain, supra note 60, at 4-5 (noting that most executives in the second sample 
group chose to delay the reporting as much as possible, until the second day after the grant date.  Furthermore, one-
fifth of reports violated the two-day reporting requirements). 
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By implementing a fixed option grant date any possible delay in reporting is eliminated 
and there is no way to backdate options.  Those executives who do not comply with the reporting 
requirements established by a fixed grant date scheme would be subject to automatic fines.  
These automatic fines serve as a deterrent, limiting the amount of late reporting that occurs.  
D. The harms of backdating  
1.  Harm to corporations 
 There are a wide range of repercussions facing organizations that have been involved in 
backdating.  Even companies which did not backdate but engaged in questionable stock option 
transactions are encountering harmful consequences.  An organization that is under suspicion 
faces costly internal investigations (in addition to inquiries by the SEC, the United States Justice 
Department, and federal prosecutors), the loss of their top executives due to resignations and/or 
firings, financial loss from improper grants, financial loss due to the high costs related to 
restating several years' worth of earnings, potential declines in the company's stock price upon 
announcements of potential backdating, and even possible delisting of shares on the market due 
to inability to meet SEC reporting requirements. 
Most companies under suspicion are conducting internal investigations, often through 
board appointed special committees composed of disinterested members of the audit committee.  
Some investigations are resulting in the company pursuing claims against various executives that 
were involved.74  Other companies are not penalizing executives but rather paying the taxes and 
penalties owed by executives who received improperly timed options.75  
                                                 
74 Ted Allen & Subodh Mishra, An Investor Guide to the Stock Option Timing Scandal, INSTITUTIONAL 
SHAREHOLDER SERVICES 1, 5 (July 2006) available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/OptionTiming.pdf.  E.g., 
Barasch et al., supra note 2. 
75 Allen & Mishra, supra note 74, at 4 ("Brocade Communications said it will pay $3.3 million to executives and 
employees who received questionable options and it has offered to cancel the options or to raise their exercise price, 
and then pay the employees for the difference in cash"). 
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The primary consequences that companies face from backdating relate to accounting and 
tax reporting.76 
Because of the misdating of option grants, many companies have reported that 
their accounting for options was erroneous and that they must take additional 
charges for compensation expense against their income. A significant portion 
have restated, or expect to restate, their historical financial statements to reflect 
these charges and have announced that, as a result, their previously issued 
financial statements can no longer be relied upon, in some cases going back more 
than a decade.77  
 
Some companies have not been able to file their periodic SEC reports when they become due, as 
the organization has "not been able to determine the amount of the compensation charges they 
will need to take and, accordingly, cannot prepare consistent and comparable financial data for 
current and prior periods." 78  The companies that do not file required reports with the SEC run 
the risk of being delisted from stock exchanges.79  Further, failure to file certain reports and/or 
"material errors in previously issued financial statements may violate covenants or 
representations or warranties in debt instruments, presenting a risk of default...[and may] disrupt 
key license, joint venture or other business relationships for which current SEC reporting or 
financial statements are required."80 
 
                                                 
76 BLANK ROME LLP, supra note 27 (financial consequences include:  
Material errors in financial statements requiring restatement; Inaccurate executive  compensation 
disclosure in proxy statements and Annual Reports on Form 10-K; Inaccurate Section 16 filings 
by officers and directors; Voiding of options not granted in compliance with applicable stock 
option plans; Exposure of deficiencies or material weaknesses in internal control over financial 
reporting and disclosure controls; Liability of CEOs and CFOs for false certifications of SEC 
reports; Loss of tax deductions and imposition of penalties and interest for failure to withhold and 
report income and employment tax correctly; Potential imposition of federal income taxes, excise 
taxes, interest and penalties upon employees under Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, as amended, as a result of the creation of a "disqualified deferred compensation plan). 
77 WEIL BRIEFING, supra note 1, at 1. 
78 Id.  
79 U.S. Option Scandal Swells Nasdaq Delistings Docket, REUTERS, Oct. 3, 2006, at http://today.reuters.com/news 
(noting "[o]ver 50 companies presently face NASDAQ delisting, and a half-dozen more face NYSE delisting, as a 
result of option backdating problems forcing delayed financial reporting."). 
80 WEIL BRIEFING, supra note 1, at 1. 
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2.  Harm to the market  
 The controversy and concern over backdating stock options has affected the markets as 
well.  Distrust in the marketplace has led to a decline in stock prices of many organizations.  
Investors who lose confidence in an organization and its management have "bid down the stock 
prices of some of the companies caught up in the various probes."81  It has been estimated that 
companies involved in backdating have "lost on average a market value of $510 million per firm 
during a window of 21 days around the first announcement that implicated a firm in 
backdating."82  Ultimately, shareholders are hurt by the decline in the market value of a 
company's shares as their investment.   
II. CAUSES OF ACTION 
A. Potential areas of violation 
1. Corporate governance and violations of the option plan 
 Liability arises in a number of scenarios where the illegal backdating of stock options has 
occurred.  Corporations and executives are liable to the organization and its shareholders when 
they violate the company's stock option plan and/or shareholder approval requirements.  These 
violations may occur whether the backdating was intentional or not.83  These companies face 
"the possibilities of loss of leadership resulting from executive resignations or removals, 
                                                 
81 Forelle & Bandler, Backdating Probe Widens, supra note 24 (for example, Vitesse Semiconductor Corporation's 
shares fell 40% after suspending a number of executives, and UnitedHealth Group Incorporated's shares fell 18%, 
decreasing the company's market capitalization by more than $13 billion). Accord Allen & Mishra, supra note 74, at 
4; Tarallo & Hanselman, supra note 52, at 2. 
82 M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Option, Aug. 2006, at 4-5, at 
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/optiondating/files/060905mlr.pdf.   
83 Elizabeth A. Brower et al., Stock Option Grant Practices Under Scrutiny: The SEC Weighs In, CLIENT ALERT 
(Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP), Sept. 2006, at 1, at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/Backup/Client_Alerts/38483.PDF?wt.mc_ID=38483.pdf. 
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significant civil penalties, additional tax liabilities, securities fraud charges, exchange delisting, 
bank defaults, departure of directors and possibly criminal charges."84   
 Some potential areas of concern include the granting of options even though the 
company's stock option plan does not allow the exercise price to be less than its fair market value 
on its grant date or where shareholder approval is necessary before such an option may be 
granted.85 The board of directors may face allegations that it did not adhere to the company's 
principles of corporate governance or code of conduct.86   
Companies may encounter problems with the removal of directors and the reelection of 
compensation committee members who shareholders feel are liable for past violations and 
obtaining future shareholder approval of stock option plans.87 Shareholders have begun to sue, 
claiming fundamental unfairness and unjust enrichment as executives realized "significant 
monetary gains" while breaching their fiduciary duty of loyalty to the organization in placing 
their own interests ahead of those of the company and its shareholders.88   
Finally, in some situations where directors intentionally violate an option plan and a 
company makes fraudulent disclosures regarding its compliance with such plans in filings or 
other public disclosures, the directors may be deemed to have acted in bad faith and to have 
breached the duty of loyalty by acting deceptively (and therefore outside the protections of the 
business judgment rule).  Director and Officer insurance policies may not protect organizations 
in these situations.89  "In such circumstances, directors may lose the indemnification and other 
                                                 
84 Greely & Greene, supra note 22, at 1. 
85 FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 16, at 3.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 4.  See also Linda Chatman Thomsen, Enforcement Director, Securities and Exchange Comm'n, Remarks, 
(Oct. 30, 2006) at www.sec.gov/news/speech (observing "[m]any companies have lost an entire generation of 
seasoned executives ... undoubtedly causing enormous disruption and upheavals at the affected companies").   
88 FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 16, at 1.  
89 Timing is Everything: Stock Option Practices Under Scrutiny, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADVISORY (Hughes, 
Hubbard & Reed LLP), Aug. 2006, at 2, 
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liability protections ... and may be personally liable for resulting damages to the company."90  It 
has been said that "intentional backdating is one of those 'rare cases [in which] a transaction may 
be so egregious on its face that board approval cannot meet the test of business judgment, and a 
substantial likelihood of director liability therefore exists.'"91  
2.  Major theories of liability  
 Companies and various executives who are involved in the illegal backdating of stock 
options face liability in a number of additional scenarios.  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the DOJ, and shareholders have a variety of potential causes of action available to 
them.  The government may bring criminal, civil fraud or nonfraud charges against alleged 
violators and shareholders may bring civil actions.92   
a.  Disclosure 
 Publicly traded companies are required by law to make various disclosures, typically 
through SEC filings.  "Disclosure, which focuses on what the [public] knew, and when, is at the 
heart of many securities fraud cases."93  Companies that have engaged in illegal backdating may 
be found to have violated federal securities law disclosure rules.  For example, a company's 
proxy statements may have been misstated from either an executive compensation disclosure or 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.hugheshubbard.com/files/tbl_s20NewsPring/PDFUpload103/1433/Corp_Gov_August_2006_Options_T
iming_Alert_Advisory_rev9.pdf (Certain D&O policies "(i) exclude coverage for 'intentionally wrongful acts,' (ii) 
contain 'options exclusions,' which exclude policy coverage for claims relating to the issuance or use of stock 
options, or (iii) contain 'personal profit' exclusions, which exclude coverage for claims involving an insured person 
who gained a personal profit to which he or she was not legally entitled."). See generally KIRKPATRICK & 
LOCKHART NICHOLSON GRAHAM LLP, supra note 47, at 6. 
90 Two Delaware Chancery Court Cases on Backdating and Spring-Loading Stock Options Increase the Stakes for 
Directors, JONES DAY COMMENTARY (Jones Day), Feb. 17, 2007, at 1-2, at 
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/9babe2ef-6d5b-4671-b250-
059781b1d40a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/438f1b32-cf01-4838-94ce-
41db55f1b272/Two%20Delaware.pdf. 
91 Id. at 1.   
92 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1958 (the determination between charges that the government may bring will "largely 
turn on the state of mind of those involved.  Criminal cases can be based on 'willful' violations of the securities laws. 
(Securities Act § 24; Exchange Act § 32(a)) [while] civil fraud cases can be based on reckless conduct. (Aaron v. 
SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ponce v. SEC, 345 F.3d 722, 729 (9th Cir. 2003))). 
93 DEWEY BALLANTINE LLP, supra note 13, at 4.  
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an option plan approval standpoint.  The company may have inaccurate periodic reports that 
reflect these misstatements.94   
It is important to note that violations may occur based on non-required disclosures.  Even 
if information is not required to be disclosed, any information that is disclosed voluntarily must 
nonetheless be accurate.95  Further, backdating of options may lead to the identification of 
weaknesses in the internal controls or the disclosure controls of a company.96  
It appears that the majority of complaints brought by the SEC and/or DOJ will be brought 
for some form of failure to disclose.  These charges are the most likely to succeed as they will be 
the easiest to prove after illegal backdating is uncovered (as material information was either 
disclosed in periodic reports and proxy statements or it was not). 
b.  Accounting 
 Financial reporting issues arise with illegally backdated stock options.  Illegal backdating 
may "cause the improper statement or underreporting of compensation expense, triggering a 
restatement of the company's financials going back to the date of the misdated option grants."97  
The potential issue relating to liability is whether the stock option grants were properly recorded 
as expenses.  Until recently, companies did not have to expense stock options that were granted 
at the money.  However, with in the money options, the difference between the strike price and 
the then current share price was required to be identified as an expense.98  "Thus, to the extent 
backdating occurred, it may have affected the amount a company expensed."99 
                                                 
94 FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 16, at 3. 
95 Id. at 4.  
96 Id. at 3. 
97 Id. 
98 DEWEY BALLANTINE LLP, supra note 13, at 5.  
99 Id. at 4.  
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 If options are later determined to have been in the money on the date they were actually 
granted, substantial earnings restatements may be required to recognize the newly accounted for 
expense.  This may place "CEOs and CFOs at risk of a violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
certification requirements (and may trigger its disgorgement provisions)."100  Penalties for these 
accounting violations will be assessed against a number of companies as these violations are 
easily recognizable after the discovery of illegal backdating. 
c.  Tax violations 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will be working with the DOJ and the SEC on the 
options backdating investigations.101  Potential negative tax consequences may occur when there 
is illegal backdating.  Generally, at the money option grants comply with Internal Revenue Code 
rules allowing for favorable tax treatment for both the company and the recipients.  However, in 
the money options do not qualify for this favorable tax treatment.102 
Backdating to a lower strike price, in effect, creates in the money options.  Thus, "any tax 
reporting that occurred prior to the revelation of the backdating may need to be revised, with the 
likelihood of additional tax liability to the company, and to the recipients."103  Backdating may 
                                                 
100 HUGHES, HUBBARD & REED LLP, supra note 89, at 1.  
101 Mark Everson, Internal Revenue Commissioner, Senate Finance Committee Testimony (Sept. 6, 2006) at 
www.senate.gov/~finance.  
102 DEWEY BALLANTINE LLP, supra note 13, at 5-6.  See also Nichols, supra note 68, at 2 (explaining that  
[t]here are two common types of employee stock options: nonstatutory stock options (NSOs) and 
incentive stock options (ISOs). When an employee exercises an NSO, the difference between the 
exercise price and the fair market value of the stock on the date of exercise is taxed at ordinary 
income tax rates. The company has withholding obligations on the employee’s gain, but also gets 
a corresponding tax deduction. With backdated or misdated options, the employee may have a 
larger tax obligation. And while the company has a larger tax deduction, it also has a greater 
withholding obligation. An option grant loses its favorable ISO status if the option is awarded "in 
the money." Thus a company that granted options at a discount which it believed were ISOs would 
not have withheld income tax or FICA upon exercise of the option. The company could now be 
liable for the amount of income tax and FICA it failed to withhold on exercise of the discounted 
option that did not meet ISO requirements.). 
103 DEWEY BALLANTINE LLP, supra note 13, at 5-6. 
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"lead to Internal Revenue Code § 409A tax problems, where there is an immediate taxation of 
the option spread on the option vesting date, rather than the option exercise date."104  
Another issue likely to arise applies to options granted to the company's CEO and highest 
paid officers.   
Under Internal Revenue Code section 162(m), companies may not deduct more 
than $1 million in compensation to each of these five individuals.  'Performance-
based compensation,' however, is exempted from the $1 million limit.  In order 
for a stock option to qualify as 'performance-based compensation,' the amount of 
the compensation the employee receives must be based on an increase in the stock 
price after the date of the grant.105 
 
Backdated options generally do not meet this qualification and, therefore, the grants will be 
counted toward the $1 million limit that companies are permitted to deduct as opposed to being 
exempted.  Similar to penalties for accounting violations, tax-based charges are quite likely to be 
brought against a number of companies as these violations are easily recognizable once 
backdating has been uncovered.  
d.  Insider trading 
 A less discussed potential theory of liability exists in insider trading, the buying and/or 
selling of stock based on material, non-public information.  Companies which face allegations of 
spring loading, granting options immediately prior to the release of good news, or those who 
"backdate[d] stock options on the eve of a company receiving favorable news, but before such 
                                                 
104 FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 16, at 3.  See generally Patrick McCabe & Paul Borden, Tax Issues Arising 
Out of Stock Options Back-Dating Investigations, LEGAL UPDATE (Morrison Foerster), June 2006, at 
http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update02204.html; Compliance Resolution Program for Employees Other 
than Corporate Insiders for Additional 2006 Taxes Arising Under § 409A due to the Exercise of Stock Rights, 
ANNOUNCEMENT 2007-18 (Internal Revenue Service), Feb. 8, 2007, at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/a-07-18.pdf; 
Press Release, Internal Revenue Service 2007-30, IRS Offers Opportunity for Employers to Satisfy Tax Obligations 
of Rank-and-File Employees with 'Backdated' Stock Options (Feb 8, 2006) 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=167643,00.html. 
105 DEWEY BALLANTINE LLP, supra note 13, at 5-6. 
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news was made public" may encounter charges for insider trading.106  Insider trading is a 
favorable method for the SEC and the DOJ to pursue because it "is a relatively simple concept to 
explain compared to other securities fraud theories, and carries with it tremendous juror 
appeal."107  It is unlikely that insider trading claims will be brought in "traditional" backdating 
cases unless it can be shown that the backdating occurred due to material nonpublic information.  
Therefore, this is a weaker cause of action. 
 3. Analysis 
 Ultimately, there are a number of possible theories in which a person may face liability 
for illegal options backdating.  At this stage, inaccurate or inadequate disclosure is the primary 
violation that is being litigated.  Thus, it is the top executives, the ones who enacted or knew 
about illegal policies, who are facing blame.  However, this is not enough.  Under the first prong 
of the proposed solution all possible causes of action should be utilized where appropriate.  This 
would hold accountable auditors who either ratified illegal procedures by doing nothing upon 
discovery of such, or who failed in their duties to detect such illegalities.  It would hold liable the 
attorneys who gave advice in contravention of the law or who ratified illegal behavior by doing 
nothing to prevent it.  It would hold entire compensation committees who enacted illegal options 
practices liable.  Finally, it may even hold the company itself liable for, among other things, 
enacting inadequate procedures to prevent illegal options practices.   
The justice system must make an example out of these offenders in order to truly deter 
illegal options practices in the future.  Litigation must be pursued under every cause of action 
available and against all violators in order to penalize those who profited off of the manipulation 
                                                 
106 Id. at 6-7.  See also The Stock Option Controversy – The Scrutiny Escalates, CLIENT ALERT (Proskauer Rose 
LLP), July 2006, at 2-4, 
http://www.proskauer.com/news_publications/client_alerts/content/2006_07_18/_res/id=sa_PDF/12745-071406-
The%20Stock%20Option%20Controversy-v5.pdf.  
107  DEWEY BALLANTINE LLP, supra note 13, at 5-6. 
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and deceit to their organizations shareholders and the investing public.  Only when people such 
as attorneys and auditors fear that they will face large penalties along with the top executives will 
there be a deterrent effect.  
Under the second prong of the proposed solution, all backdating will be prohibited and a 
uniform grant date will be required of every organization.  This will streamline the options 
granting process, limiting the potential for continuing backdating violations.  This part of the 
solution is essential because of the limited resources that the SEC and DOJ have to pursue 
violators.  By enacting a standardized structure for the grant process, the punishment of 
violations can also become more efficient.  Standard fines can be imposed where reporting 
requirements have not been met.  Not only will these be easy to monitor due to a fixed grant 
date, but they can be imposed automatically, without the cost and delay of the current litigation 
process.  The deterrent effect created by prong one of the solution is strengthened by imposing 
such penalties.  By enacting a uniform grant date requirement, a number of the aforementioned 
causes of action will not be necessary as backdating will be virtually non-existent and any 
failures can be efficiently punished. 
B. Consequences to those who profited from and/or participated in options backdating 
The most important question facing companies which have been alleged to have 
participated in options backdating is how these cases will be prosecuted and how the government 
will determine whether to bring criminal charges, civil fraud actions or nonfraud charges.  
1. Shareholder lawsuits  
As allegations of illegal options backdating come to light, shareholders are becoming 
more and more displeased and are holding the companies and their executives accountable for 
the misconduct.  A number of complaints have been filed against various organizations.  Thus 
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far, over 25 companies have been sued by shareholders.108  These shareholder derivative suits 
accuse various executives of having manipulated stock options grants for their own benefit, thus 
"wasting" corporate assets.109  
Recent derivative suits have asserted claims based upon breach of fiduciary duty and 
unjust enrichment, and sought damages suffered by the company as an entity.110  Shareholders 
are seeking "recovery of profits resulting from option grants and the costs of internal 
investigations, and to a lesser extent, class actions seeking damages in connection with alleged 
backdating."111  
Courts have refused to dismiss complaints against directors who were allegedly involved 
in option backdating.  Although the court recognized that a board of director's "decisions 
regarding executive compensation generally are entitled to great deference – the court's holdings 
emphasize that directors may face fiduciary liability for their actions – or inaction – related to 
option grant practices."112 
 Defendant directors will argue that the organization was not injured as a result of option 
backdating.  Among other things, a "plaintiff in a derivative suit must prove that but for the 
breach of fiduciary duty (here the backdating of the option and the failure to accrue a 
compensation expense) the company would not have suffered injury."113  They may argue that 
                                                 
108 Allen & Mishra, supra note 74, at 5. 
109 Focus on Backdating of Stock Option Grants Intensifies, SEC. LITIG. ALERT (Bingham McCutchen LLC), Aug. 
10, 2006, at 2, at http://www.bingham.com/bingham/webadmin/documents/radD7328.pdf [hereinafter BINGHAM 
MCCUTCHEN LLC, Focus on Backdating]. 
110 Stock Option Backdating – Regulators and Plaintiffs Take the Controversy to the Next Level, SEC. UPDATE 
(Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw), Aug. 1, 2006, at 3, at 
http://www.mayerbrownrowe.com/litigation/securitiesenforcement/publications/article.asp?id=2889&nid=4525. 
111 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1958 (quoting Atkins, supra note 41).  
112 Stephen Alexander et al., Delaware Court of Chancery Issues Two Important Decisions on Stock Options 
Backdating, Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging, SEC. & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LITIG. ALERT (Bingham 
McCutchen LLC), Feb. 15, 2007, at 4, at http://www.bingham.com/Bingham/webadmin/documents/radEFA88.pdf.  
113 MAYER BROWN ROWE & MAW, supra note 110, at 3. See also Paul Vizcarrondo, Jr. & Joshua A. Naftalis, 
Delaware Chancery Court Addresses Stock Option Backdating and "Spring-Loading,"  UPDATE (Wachtell, Lipton, 
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the cost of the backdated options would have alternatively come from an equivalent cash bonus 
that would be required to attract and retain talented employees, thus costing the organization the 
same amount and amounting to no injury to the company.  Although the costs of executive 
compensation may have had to come from the company one way or another, the directors should 
be held responsible for their deceit and their violations of the law relating to such.  It is 
imperative that culpable executives are not able to lay blame on others in this manner.  
Arguments claiming that equivalent bonuses would have been given must be dismissed for 
ignoring the frauds that were enacted on both the company and the market by concealing the 
illegal backdating.   
Other class action lawsuits allege violations of the securities laws.  "[M]ore suits can be 
anticipated where companies have a significant stock price drop following the announcement of 
a restatement of financial results."114  Again, even if the price does decrease, defendants may 
argue that the drop was not caused by the announcement of past alleged incorrect financial 
statements. 
There has been a great deal of variation in the market's responses to corporate 
announcements of options backdating issues, which suggests that there is much 
more at work than merely the elimination of stock price inflation, if any, traced to 
alleged false financial statements in the past. Some companies' stock prices have 
declined while others have not.  Some have declined much more than others.  In 
addition, many companies have made multiple announcements, provoking 
different stock price reactions to each one.  Economists and econometricians 
should be able to analyze this data and show that the observed stock price declines 
were due to factors other than the disclosure of the accounting adjustments. This 
could in turn support arguments that the plaintiffs' alleged damages were not 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rosen & Katz), Feb. 8, 2007, at 1-2, at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2007/02/20070210%20Postdating%20Memorandum.pdf (noting 
A plaintiff bringing a derivative complaint is generally required to first make a demand on the 
corporation’s board of directors to remedy the alleged misconduct and to decide whether a lawsuit 
would be in the best interests of the corporation. This demand requirement is excused, however, 
where there is a reason to doubt whether the challenged transactions involved valid exercise of 
business judgment or that a majority of the directors would have been independent and 
disinterested when considering the demand.) 
114 BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLC, Focus on Backdating, supra note 109, at 2. 
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caused by the alleged backdating misconduct and are not recoverable, but rather 
were the result of the market's reaction to the possibility of other adverse 
developments distantly related to the option backdating, but not necessarily 
foreseeable at the time of the alleged misconduct – e.g., disruption to 
management, fear of firing of key employees, the specter of litigation, etc. 
Defendants may argue that these damages were not proximately caused by the 
alleged backdating misconduct and are not recoverable.115 
 
Again, although defendants may be able to escape liability by making such a showing in 
shareholder derivative suits, their failure to disclose and criminal violations must not be 
dismissed. 
Although a number of cases have been filed, most are in the preliminary stages.  
Therefore, it is difficult to analyze whether or not the companies and directors will be held liable.  
However, it is helpful to analyze some of these cases and their precedential (and deterrent) 
effects.   
1. Ryan v. Gifford 
In Ryan v. Gifford a shareholder of Maxim Integrated Products Incorporated filed a 
derivative lawsuit alleging that the board of directors breached its fiduciary duties of due care 
and loyalty by approving or accepting backdated stock option grants to the CEO that violated the 
company's shareholder approved stock option and stock incentive plans.116 
Maxim's compensation committee had granted stock options for the purchase of millions 
of shares of Maxim's common stock to Gifford, the company's CEO and chairman, pursuant to 
shareholder approved stock options plans which required that the exercise price be "no less than 
the fair market value" of the company's stock on the date of the grant.  The plaintiff alleged that 
                                                 
115 MAYER BROWN ROWE & MAW, supra note 110, at 4.  
116 Ryan v. Gifford, No. 2213-N, 2007 WL 416162 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2007). 
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the defendant directors knowingly and intentionally violated the terms of the plan by backdating 
the actual dates of nine specific option grants.117   
In bringing the action, the shareholder relied on a Merrill Lynch report released in 2006 
analyzing the timing of stock options grants by certain companies, including Maxim.  Merrill 
Lynch reported "the return on options grants to Maxim's management averaged an annualized 
return of 243%, almost ten times higher than the 29% annualized market returns in the same 
period."118 
Here, the court excused the plaintiff from making demand, stating "backdating options 
qualifies as one of those 'rare cases [in which] a transaction may be so egregious on its face that 
board approval cannot meet the test of business judgment, and a substantial likelihood of director 
liability therefore exists.'"119  The court stated that "intentional violation of a shareholder 
approved option plan, coupled with inaccurate disclosures in proxy statements regarding the 
directors' purported compliance with that plan, constitutes conduct that is disloyal to the 
corporation and in bad faith as a board has 'no discretion to contravene the terms of stock option 
plans.'"120  The court rejected the defendants' claim that the allegations were based upon nothing 
more than statistical abstractions.121  However, in order to prevail at trial, the plaintiff would 
                                                 
117 Id.  
118 Alexander et al., supra note 112, at 1 (citing Ryan, 2007 WL 416162 at *2, *3).  Accord JONES DAY, supra note 
90, at 3; Delaware Court of Chancery Addresses Stock Option Dating and Timing Issues, LATHAM & WATKINS 
BULLETIN NO. 568 (Latham & Watkins LLP), Feb. 8, 2007, at 
http://www.lw.com/resource/Publications/ClientAlerts/clientAlert.asp?pid=1775.  
119 Ryan, 2007 WL 416162 at *10 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984)). See also JONES DAY, 
supra note 90, at 3 (the allegations here were "sufficient to raise a reason to doubt the disinterestedness of Maxim's 
board and to suggest that they were incapable of impartially considering demand"). 
120 JONES DAY, supra note 90, at 3 (citing Ryan, 2007 WL 416162 at *8 (The court found that the "intentional 
violation of a shareholder approved stock option plan, coupled with fraudulent disclosures regarding the directors' 
purported compliance with that plan, constitute[d] conduct that is disloyal to the corporation and is therefore an act 
in bad faith.")). 
121 Alexander et al., supra note 112, at 3 (citing Ryan, 2007 WL 416162 at *9 n.34 (explaining 
True, the Merrill Lynch report does not state conclusively that Gifford's options were actually 
backdated.  Rather, it emphatically suggests that either defendant directors knowingly manipulated 
the dates on which options were granted, or their timing was extraordinarily lucky.  Given the 
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need to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants had illegally 
backdated options and "intended to circumvent company approved policies and procedures 
regarding the grant or exercise price of company stock options."122 
 Ryan v. Gifford "raise[s] the possibility that officers and directors who engage in the type 
of backdating ...alleged in those cases could face personal liability.  Such conduct, if proven at 
trial, would be a breach of the duty of loyalty, for which Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL 
[(Delaware General Corporate Law)] will not afford any protection."123  If individual directors 
and officers are held personally liable for their backdating misconduct, shareholders will not be 
forced to pay for these wrongs another time.  Because the company's Director and Officer 
insurance would not be available, damages would be assessed on the individual executives as 
opposed to coming from such a company-paid policy.  Such personal liability will have 
tremendous deterrent effect on officers and directors, preventing future corporate frauds for fear 
of personal financial loss.     
2. In re Tyson  
 Another example of a shareholder derivative suit is In re Tyson, which recently withstood 
a motion to dismiss.  In this case shareholders brought derivative and class actions against the 
Tyson corporation, its controlling shareholder, and current and former directors and officers to 
recover for breach of fiduciary duties.124 
 Tyson had adopted a Stock Incentive Plan granting the board, and the compensation 
committee, permission to award various incentives to employees, officers, and directors but 
                                                                                                                                                             
choice between improbable good fortune and knowing manipulation of option grants, the Court 
may reasonably infer the latter...)). 
122 JONES DAY, supra note 90, at 3.  
123  See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (stating "good faith" is a subsidiary element of the duty of 
loyalty as distinct from a duty separate from the duties of care and loyalty). 
124 In re Tyson Foods, Inc., No. Civ. A. 1106-N, 2007 WL 416132 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2007).  
 33
requiring that the price of stock options be no lower than the fair market value of the company's 
stock on the day of the grant.125  The plaintiff shareholders alleged that the defendant board 
members ordered the compensation committee to spring-load these options by granting them to 
key employees days before Tyson issued press releases that were very likely to drive stock prices 
higher.126  It is alleged that approximately 2.8 million shares of Tyson stock were awarded to the 
various defendants in this manner.  The plaintiffs contend that the board violated its fiduciary 
duties by approving these options during 1999 to 2003 as well as for failure to investigate self-
dealing payments and misrepresentation in the proxy statement.127 
 The court denied the defendants motion to dismiss, finding that the Tyson directors' 
alleged spring loading of stock options involved bad faith and was not protected by business 
judgment rule.128  The court noted that the granting of spring-loaded options, without shareholder 
authorization, "clearly involves an indirect deception...[as a] director's duty of loyalty includes 
the duty to deal fairly and honestly with the shareholders for whom he is a fiduciary."129  The 
court stated that the issue:  
... is not, as plaintiffs suggest, whether spring-loading constitutes a form of insider 
trading as it would be understood under federal securities law.  The relevant issue 
is whether a director acts in bad faith by authorizing options with a market-value 
strike price, as he is required to do by a shareholder approved incentive option 
plan, at a time when he knows those shares are actually worth more than the 
exercise price.  A director who intentionally uses inside knowledge not available 
to shareholders in order to enrich employees while avoiding shareholder-imposed 
                                                 
125 Id. at *5 (the proxy stated: 
The Plan provides for the grant of incentive stock options and nonqualified options.... The exercise 
price of an option shall be set forth in the applicable Stock Incentive agreement. The exercise price 
of an incentive stock option may not be less than the fair market value of the Class A Common 
Stock on the date of the grant (nor less than 100% of the fair market value if the participant owns 
more than 10% of the stock of the Company or any subsidiary)).  
126 Id.  
127 Id. at *9. 
128 Id. at *18. 
129 Id. (citing In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005) ("To act in good faith, a director must act at all 
times with an honesty of purpose and in the best interests and welfare of the corporation")). 
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requirements cannot, in my opinion, be said to be acting loyally and in good faith 
as a fiduciary.130 
 
The court did note that a plaintiff must meet the requirement to "show adequately at the pleading 
stage that a director acted disloyally and in bad faith and is therefore unable to claim the 
protection of the business judgment rule."131 
 This case exemplifies the potential liability that an organization and its directors face for 
intentional misrepresentations or other illegalities relating to option granting practices.  The 
penalties that are assessed to the corporation will serve as an important precedent.  The deterrent 
effects of personal liability in illegal options backdating cases will be increased.  
2. The Justice Department  
 Organizations that have found themselves involved in the illegal backdating scandal do 
not have to worry only about suits brought by shareholders of the company.  In a coordinated 
enforcement action, the SEC and the DOJ have begun to file civil and criminal cases.  The SEC 
has publicly stated that it is sharing the results of its investigations with the DOJ and the IRS, 
allowing for concerted actions that are more efficient.132 
The Justice Department has said it "will bring criminal charges for option backdating 
where defendants intentionally (i) falsify corporate books and records; (ii) issue false financial 
statements; (iii) lie to boards, auditors and the SEC; and (iv) file false reports with the SEC."133 
                                                 
130 In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 2007 WL 416132 at *18. 
131 Id. at *19 (two things are required in order to show that a spring-loaded option issued is beyond the bounds of 
business judgment.  "First, a plaintiff must allege that options were issued according to a shareholder-approved 
employee compensation plan.  Second, a plaintiff must allege that the directors that approved spring-loaded options 
(a) possessed material non-public information soon to be released that would impact the company's share price, and 
(b) issued those options with the intent to circumvent otherwise valid shareholder-approved restrictions upon the 
exercise price of the options.").  
132 Nichols, supra note 68, at 1. 
133 Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, Senate Finance Committee Testimony (Sept. 6, 2006), at 
www.senate.gov/~finance.  
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Criminal charges may also be brought for obstruction of justice, perjury, criminal tax violations, 
and in more recent matters, Sarbanes-Oxley violations.134 
 On the criminal side, the FBI recently reported active criminal investigations of 52 
companies concerning option backdating.135  United States Attorneys' Offices throughout the 
country, assisted by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are pursuing option 
backdating matters.  States such as California have even formed a stock option backdating task 
force.136  The United States Attorneys' offices in New York, Boston and elsewhere have been 
conducting criminal investigations parallel to the SEC involving some of the same companies.137 
The DOJ is assessing criminal charges in dozens of cases.  Executives who participated 
in backdating are open to criminal fraud charges of enriching themselves through false or 
misleading records or filings.  Such criminal charges would require that an executive who took 
part in backdating did so intentionally yet it is likely that, like past corporate-fraud cases, 
executives will attempt to use the defense that they relied on advice of lawyers or other experts 
and, therefore, did not intentionally participate in any illegal activities.138  As previously stated, 
defenses such as reliance on the advice of an attorney should not be permitted to allow directors 
who knew or should have known that what they were doing was illegal or in violation of 
company policy to escape liability.  
                                                 
134 Id.  
135 FBI Promises Crackdown on Stock-Option Fraud as Cases Increase, BLOOMBERG BUS. NEWS, Sept. 26, 2006, 
www.bloomberg.com (quoting Chip Burrus, FBI Assistant Director). 
136 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1958 (quoting Kevin v. Ryan, U.S. Attorney (July 13, 2006), available at 
www.usdoj.gov/usao/can/press).  
Independent actions, such as these, by the states lends to the deterrent effect created through strict enforcement of 
laws relating to backdating violations.   
137 BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLC, Focus on Backdating, supra note 109, at 2 (for example, on July 21, 2006, the U.S. 
Attorney in San Francisco filed criminal charges against Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.'s former CEO 
Gregory Reyes and another executive, while the SEC filed a related civil case against the same defendants plus a 
former CFO). 
138 Forelle & Bandler, Backdating Probe Widens, supra note 24. 
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To date, criminal charges have only been brought against former executives of two public 
companies, Brocade Communications Systems, Incorporated and Comverse Technology, 
Incorporated, for securities fraud stemming from options handling.  Although both of these cases 
are in their preliminary stages, they will be closely followed and scrutinized as they will set the 
standard for executive liability in illegal backdating cases.  
a. Brocade Communications Systems, Incorporated and CEO Gregory Reyes  
In the first criminal backdating case,139 the U.S. Attorney in San Francisco charged 
Gregory Reyes, former CEO and Chairman, and Stephanie Jensen, former Vice President of 
Human Resources, of Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. with willfully violating Exchange 
Act § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 through a scheme to backdate stock option grants between 2000 and 
2004.140  It is alleged that Reyes and Jensen were "briefed on the relevant accounting principles, 
but disregarded them by backdating options without taking the required compensation 
expenses."141   
 The DOJ alleges that: 
(a) Brocade's board granted Reyes sole authority to grant options, with certain 
exceptions – making him the board's one person compensation committee; (b) 
Reyes often waited until the end of a quarter to grant options; (c) Jensen's staff 
routinely printed out historical stock prices, highlighted the low dates during the 
quarter, and drafted compensation committee minutes showing option grants; (d) 
Jensen or her staff gave these materials to Reyes, who routinely signed the 
meeting minutes and dated them as if the meetings occurred on the highlighted 
                                                 
139 In the SEC’s companion civil case, the Brocade defendants are charged with securities fraud, falsification of 
books and records, making false or misleading statements to accountants, filing false and materially misleading 
statements with the SEC, filing false certifications with the SEC under Sarbanes Oxley, and failing to devise and 
maintain internal controls. See generally S.E.C. v. Reyes, No. C. 06-4435, 2007 WL 528718 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 
2007). 
140 U.S. v. Reyes, No. 3-06-70450 (N.D. Cal. filed July 20, 2006), Complaint and Supporting Affidavit at 
www.usdoj.gov/usao/can/press (the charges carry a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison).  Suits have also been 
brought by the SEC (see S.E.C. v. Reyes, 2007 WL 528718) and by shareholders (see In re Comverse Technology, 
Inc., No. 06-CV-1849, 2006 WL 3511375 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2006)).  Additionally, the company has had to restate 
its results for fiscal years 1999 – 2004. Specifically, between 1999 and 2001, its income declined by a total of $304 
million; in 2002, its income increased by $60 million; in 2003, its net loss increased by $11 million; and in 2004, its 
net loss increased by $30 million. 
141 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1960. 
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low dates, and the options were then priced on those dates; and (e) Reyes and 
Jensen also backdated offer letters and other records for new hires to include them 
in option grants priced before they were employed and at a time when the stock 
was relatively low.142 
 
Ultimately, the government's case is based on alleged inaccuracies in Brocade's 
disclosures.  In particular, "the cases proceed on the theory that the defendants deliberately 
understated Brocade's compensation expenses and made material misrepresentations in the 
corporation's financial statements."143  The allegations focus on documents related to stock 
option grants, and "allege discrepancies between the circumstances in which the documents were 
created and the information contained in the documents.  Based on those alleged discrepancies, 
the government contends that the company's financial statements, which reflected the content of 
the documents, were materially false and misleading."144  Although the complaint suggests that 
the government's case is based primarily on documentary evidence, it has been suggested "that 
the government may have one or more whistleblowers, perhaps including current or former 
employees of Brocade, who are expected to testify that they received backdated option 
grants."145 
What is unusual about this case is that the U.S. Attorney's complaint does not allege that 
Reyes personally profited from the activity charged.  Reyes backdated options not to enrich 
himself but to attract talent to his organization.  The DOJ therefore indicates the there is no need 
to show personal gain.146  However, a parallel SEC filing does allege that Reyes "knew that he, 
and other officers of the Company, similarly received options backdated as of the same dates as 
the backdated employee options.  He was thus motivated to continue the scheme, in part, to 
                                                 
142 Id. 
143 DEWEY BALLANTINE LLP, supra note 13, at 2-3. 
144 Id. at 5.  
145 Id. at 2-3.  
146 See generally John C. Grugan & Alison Tanchyk Dante, DOJ and SEC Options Backdating Investigations Net 
First Indictments, PRESS ROOM NEWS & PUBL'NS (Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP), July 26, 2006, at 
http://www.ballardspahr.com/press/article.asp?ID=1485;  DEWEY BALLANTINE LLP, supra note 13. 
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enrich himself and his fellow officers."147  It should be irrelevant whether or not Reyes 
personally profited from an illegal backdating scheme.  The relevant issue is Reyes' knowledge 
that what he was doing was wrong and illegal and his continued violations in light of this.  
This case is important in setting the precedent for the extent to which executives may be 
held liable when they have been involved in intentional backdating schemes.  Should Reyes 
receive a harsh penalty it will set the standard for other board members and the likelihood is that 
a number of bargained plea agreements will result in order to avoid a similar sentence.  Should 
Reyes avoid liability under the DOJ charges, he will still face charges from the SEC and 
shareholders.  Ultimately, it is likely that Reyes will be found liable under both actions.   
b. Comverse Technology, Incorporated and CEO Jacob Alexander 
In the second criminal backdating case148 investigated by the DOJ, the U.S. Attorney in 
Brooklyn charged Jacob "Kobi" Alexander, former CEO and Chairman; David Kreinberg, 
former CFO; and William Sorin, former General Counsel, of Comverse Technology, 
Incorporated with willfully violating Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and the mail and 
wire fraud statutes, through a scheme to backdate options, including "every company-wide grant 
from 1998 through 2001, ... and grants of options to new employees."149 
The DOJ has alleged that:  
(a) Alexander and Kreinberg had an assistant insert backdated option grant dates into 
unanimous written consents transmitted to Compensation Committee members; (b) Sorin 
received contemporaneous copies of the documents; (c) Defendants backdated options for 
new employees to days before they actually began working for Comverse; (d) Alexander 
and Kreinberg issued hundreds of thousands of backdated options to fictitious employees, 
and after approval of these grants by the compensation Committee, parked them in a 
                                                 
147 See Complaint, S.E.C. v. Reyes, No. C-06-4435. 
148 Suits have also been brought by the SEC (see Complaint, S.E.C. v. Alexander, (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 9, 2006) 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19796.pdf) and a class action lawsuit has commenced in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of stockholders (see In re Comverse 
Technology, Inc., 2006 WL 3511375).  
149 See Complaint, U.S. v. Alexander, at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19796.pdf.  
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"slush fund" to be awarded in Alexander's discretion to favored employees; and (e) 
Defendants personally exercised options, sold stock and obtained profits of $138 million 
for Alexander ($6.4 million from backdating), $12.6 million for Kreinberg (nearly $1 
million from backdating), and $14 million for Sorin (over $1 million from backdating).150 
 
One of the options granted by Alexander on October 21, 2001 was analyzed by The Wall 
Street Journal as having odds of occurring of about one in 6 billion (the stock had fallen right 
before the date of the options grants and then rose immediately afterward).151  Alexander fled to 
Namibia to avoid prosecution two months after the story ran in 2006.  Currently, federal 
authorities are working to get him extradited from Namibia. 
 Kreinberg entered a guilty plea on October 24, 2006.152  He stated to the court that "[he] 
was asked by the CEO to bring him a printout of the company's trading prices over a past year 
period to enable him to select the 'as of' date that would be used for the exercise price of the 
option grant."153  Sorin, the former Comverse General Counsel said, in entering his own guilty 
plea, that he "knew what [the CEO] was doing was wrong and did not challenge his conduct or 
share my knowledge with the board of directors and auditors of the company."154 
                                                 
150 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1960.   
151 Comverse’s Former Finance Chief Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2006, at C3 [hereinafter Chief Pleads 
Guilty]. 
152 David Kreinberg, Former CFO of Comverse Technology Inc., Pleads Guilty to Securities Fraud Charges, 
Separately Resolves Related Case with the Securities and Exchange Commission (U.S. Department of Justice), Oct. 
24, 2006, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nye/pr/2006/2006Oct24a.htm  
Kreinberg pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, mail fraud, and 
wire fraud, and one count of securities fraud. The conspiracy charge carries a maximum sentence 
of five years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to $250,000, or twice the gain or loss from the 
offense. The securities fraud charge carries a maximum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment and a 
fine of up to $1,000,000. The charges also require restitution in an amount to be determined by the 
Court, estimated at $51 million. Separately, the Securities and Exchange Commission settled its 
civil charges against Kreinberg under an agreement that provides for a permanent injunction 
enjoining him from violating or aiding and abetting violations of the antifraud, reporting, record-
keeping, internal-controls, false-statements-to auditors, Sarbanes-Oxley certification, and 
ownership-reporting provisions of the federal securities laws; a permanent officer-and-director 
bar; the payment of $2,394,917.68 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest; and a permanent 
suspension from appearing or practicing before the Commission as an accountant. 
153 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1960 (citing Chief Pleads Guilty, supra note 151, at C3).  
154 Id. (citing A Second Comverse Ex-Executive Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2006, at A3).  See also William 
F. Sorin, Former General Counsel of Comverse Technology Inc., Pleads Guilty to Securities Fraud Charge (U.S. 
Department of Justice), Nov. 2, 2006, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nye/pr/2006/2006Nov02b.htm [hereinafter 
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 This second criminal case holds great precedential value.  However, because of the delay 
due to the pending extradition of CEO Alexander, it may not prove to be as instrumental as the 
Brocade case will likely be.  I expect that the strict plea agreements that were entered into with 
Comverse executives, Kreinberg and Sorin, will prove to deter litigation and criminal 
prosecution in general, opting instead for plea agreements.  Unfortunately, these plea agreements 
will not help deterrence of future corporate frauds as much as the fear of criminal prosecution 
and the related public shaming do. 
3.  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
 As previously noted, the DOJ investigations and charges have been accompanied by 
investigations by the SEC.  Where there are criminal charges, the SEC will always file a parallel 
civil case.155  However, "the SEC can also file its own fraud charges in federal court civil actions 
where the Justice Department decides not to pursue a criminal case."156  The SEC will bring civil 
fraud charges under the Securities Act § 17(a), the Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.  Generally, these charges require proof of scienter.157 
                                                                                                                                                             
William F. Sorin] (Sorin "pleaded guilty to a one-count felony information charging conspiracy to commit securities 
fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud... [carrying] a maximum sentence of five years' imprisonment and a fine of up to 
$250,000, or twice the gain or loss from the offense" and restitution in an amount to be determined by the Court, 
estimated at up to $51 million). 
155 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1960 n.40 (The SEC filed parallel civil fraud actions in the Brocade and the 
Comverse matters to obtain additional relief available only in civil proceedings. SEC Lit. Rel. 19878 (Oct. 24, 
2006)).  See e.g. Exchange Act Release No. 19878 (Oct. 24, 2006) (the "SEC filed parallel civil fraud actions in both 
the Brocade and the Comverse matters to obtain additional relief available only in civil proceedings. The former 
Comverse CFO settled the SEC's parallel civil charges by agreeing to a permanent officer and director bar, an 
additional bar from practice as an accountant before the SEC, payment of disgorgement and interest totaling almost 
$2.4 million, and injunctive relief.").  
156 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1960. 
157 Aaron, 446 U.S. at 680.  See generally Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1960 (citing Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun 
Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1977) (generally defining scienter as "a highly unreasonable 
omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards 
of ordinary care, ... which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers [of securities] that is either known to the 
defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.")). 
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The SEC's civil complaint in Brocade "provides some indication of the kinds of conduct 
that may result in a civil fraud action...."158  The SEC brought charges against former CFO, 
Antonio Canova, even though he was not named in the criminal case.  In charging Canova with a 
civil fraud violation, the SEC alleged that he understood that what he and the company were 
doing was illegal yet he continued to both allow it and facilitate it.159  In cases such as Brocade 
where the SEC does charge fraud, "it can be expected to add the usual variety of related charges 
traditionally found in SEC financial reporting cases."160  These charges include the "core Rule 
10b-5 charges" as well as knowingly falsifying books and records, knowingly circumventing or 
failing to implement systems of internal controls (in violation of Securities Exchange Act § 
13(b)(5) and Rule 13b2-1); making material misstatements or omissions to accountants, and/or 
taking actions to mislead or fraudulently influence accountants (in violation of Rule 13b2-2); 
aiding and abetting their company in filing materially false and misleading annual and quarterly 
reports (in violation of Securities Exchange Act § 13(a) and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1 and 13a-13); 
aiding and abetting their company in failing to keep accurate books, records and accounts (in 
violation of Securities Exchange Act § 13(b)(2)(A)); and aiding and abetting their company in 
                                                 
158 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1960-61 (citing S.E.C. v. Reyes, No. C-06-4435).  
159 Id.  
(a) was "well-versed in the accounting rules that applied to the accounting for stock options," and 
discussed the rules with Brocade's outside auditors; (b) saw an email stating that Brocade's option 
price was "usually the lowest closing price" between meetings granting options, and responded by 
cautioning against making such statements; (c) heard Brocade's controller express concern about 
delay between grant dates and delivery of supporting documentation to the finance department, but 
did nothing to investigate; (d) saw an email stating that a newly-hired executive got an option 
grant through a process involving "forging option paperwork and offer letters so he could get 
better priced option," but he again did not investigate or advise the Audit Committee; (e) "helped 
facilitate the fraud" by telling the finance department to make sure the grant dates in 
Compensation Committee minutes matched the hiring dates in employee records; and (f) signed 
annual and quarterly reports and certifications while knowingly or recklessly disregarding that 
Brocade was failing to record compensation expenses for its backdated option grants.). 
160 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1961.  
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failing to maintain a sufficient system of internal accounting controls (in violation of Securities 
Exchange Act § 13(b)(2)(B)).161  
 The SEC will not likely file non-fraud charges in any less serious backdating situations 
that arise.  The SEC has suggested that they will not be inclined to recommend such cases, and 
the SEC Enforcement Director commented that "[t]he matters we are pursuing involve blatant 
and intentional conduct."162  Further, prior to 2006, there was only one civil case (and no 
criminal cases) involving stock option grants.163  By explicitly stating that lesser cases will not be 
pursued, executives will be able to continue perpetrating frauds, so long as they are not to the 
extreme extent as those that are being litigated.  This provides no deterrence and allows for a 
receptive climate for options fraud. 
  a. SEC investigations  
The SEC began examining options backdating in 2005.164  Investigations began after 
allegations of improper financial reporting of stock option grants and intentional misconduct 
relating option grants.  It is reported that upwards of 130 investigations are being currently 
conducted.165  However, the SEC has been quick to caution that people "should not expect that 
all of these investigations will result in enforcement proceedings."166  Further, to date, these 
                                                 
161 Id. at 1961 n.45 (the Comverse complaint added claims that defendants failed to file Forms 3 and 4, or filed such 
forms containing false and misleading statements regarding option expiration dates and exercise prices (in violation 
of Securities Exchange Act § 16(a) and Rule 16a-3)). 
162 Id. at 1961 n.44 (citing Thomsen, supra note 87).  
163 Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Comm'n, Congressional Testimony to Senate Banking 
Committee (Sept. 6, 2006), at www.sec.gov/news/testimony [hereinafter Cox, Congressional Testimony]. 
164 Forelle & Bandler, Backdating Probe Widens, supra note 24. 
165 WEIL BRIEFING, supra note 1, at 1 - 2. 
166 Cox, Congressional Testimony, supra note 163.  See e.g. Thomsen, supra note 87 (stating "[w]e do not expect to 
bring 100 enforcement cases regarding stock options—we are focusing on the worst conduct"). See also Delaware 
Chancery Court Finds Backdating and Spring-Loading may Violate Fiduciary Duties, WOMBLE ALERT (Womble 
Carlyle Sandridge & Rice PLLC), March 1, 2007, at 3, at http://www.wcsr.com/resources/pdfs/cs030107.pdf (the 
Division of Enforcement has stated that "in evaluating stock option backdating cases, the Division will consider 
factors such as the egregiousness of the conduct, the number of instances of backdating, the quantitative materiality 
of unrecorded compensation expense, whether a restatement was necessary, the existence of scienter and evidence of 
concealment, obstruction or lying"). 
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actions have been brought against officers of companies and not against the companies 
themselves.   
Based on case filings in recent years, the SEC is able to handle approximately 600 cases 
per year.167  However, only a "limited portion of this 600-case capacity can be allocated to option 
backdating matters, as the SEC must stretch its resources over program areas as diverse and 
demanding as insider trading, market manipulation, other disclosure matters, offering cases and 
regulation of assorted professionals."168  This limited capability for violation enforcement will 
allow options backdating violators to escape liability and, more importantly, limit the deterrent 
effect that SEC prosecutions would provide.   
The second prong of the proposed solution would minimize this problem.  By mandating 
a fixed date grant scheme with mandatory disclosure requirements, options grants would become 
more transparent.  The price of the stock on the date of the grant would be clearly ascertainable 
and allow for no variations.  Violations of the fixed date or reporting requirements would be 
punished through the imposition automatic fines.  This would alleviate the strain on the SEC's 
resources as penalties would be automatic.  The DOJ would also experience these beneficial 
effects as the loopholes that continue to allow backdating today would be closed, limiting the 
number of criminal charges brought.  The establishment of uniform option grant dates will also 
deter future violations as organizations will not want to be assessed penalties for violations, 
significantly assisting the SEC's and DOJ's limited resources.  
 
 
  
                                                 
167 See Number of SEC Enforcement Actions Declines for Third Successive Year, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1897 (Nov. 
13, 2006) (in the 2006 fiscal year (ending Sept. 30, 2006) the SEC brought 574 enforcement actions). 
168 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1958. 
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b. S.E.C. sample cases 
i. S.E.C. v. Kent H. Roberts (McAfee, Incorporated)  
The SEC recently charged Kent H. Roberts, the former General Counsel and Corporate 
Secretary of McAfee, Incorporated, with securities fraud for allegedly wrongfully repricing 
option grants to himself and others.169  The SEC alleges that Roberts, secretly and without 
authorization, changed the date of a grant made to him in order to take advantage of McAfee's 
then-declining stock price, which increased the value of his option grant by approximately 
$197,500.170  Roberts is said to have concealed this fraud by filing false stock ownership reports 
with the SEC as well as by failing to properly disclose the illegal repricing and the benefit 
conferred to him in a proxy statement which he signed.171 
Roberts is charged with violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and Rule 
10b-5 thereunder (the antifraud provisions), violating Section 13(b)(5) of the Securities 
Exchange Act and Rule 13b2-1 thereunder (for circumventing internal controls), and with 
violating Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 16a-3 thereunder (regarding disclosures of 
stock ownership by public company officers).172   Additionally, Roberts is charged with 
violating, and aiding and abetting in violations by McAfee under Section 14(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act and Rules 14a-3 and 14a-9 thereunder (for proxy statement disclosure 
violations).173  
The SEC is seeking "injunctive relief, disgorgement, and money penalties against 
Roberts, in addition to a permanent bar to prohibit Roberts from serving as an officer or director 
                                                 
169 SEC v. Roberts, Civ. A. No. 07-CV-00407 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2007) at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20020.pdf. 
170 See Id.   
171 See Id.  
172 SEC Charges Former General Counsel of McAfee, Inc. for Fraudulently Re-Pricing Option Grants, Litigation 
Release No. 20020 (Feb. 28, 2007) at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20020.htm. 
173 Id. 
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of a public company."174  Ideally, the final penalties assessed on Roberts will be high enough to 
deter both backdating and other potential future corporate frauds. 
ii. S.E.C. v. Myron F. Olesnyckyj (Monster Worldwide, Incorporated)   
The SEC recently announced the charges against Myron F. Olesnyckyj, the former 
General Counsel of Monster Worldwide, Incorporated.  The SEC charged Olesnyckyj with 
securities fraud for allegedly participating in a multi-year scheme to secretly backdate stock 
options granted to thousands of Monster officers, directors and employees.175 
The SEC alleges that, from 1997 through 2003, Olesnyckyj backdated stock options 
grants to coincide with the dates of low closing prices for Monster's stock, resulting in grants of 
in the money options to numerous individuals.176  It is alleged that this occurred by allowing 
certain officers and employees to select a closing stock price at which they wanted their stock 
options granted.  Olesnyckyj then prepared, or directed others to prepare, backdated 
documentation for the company's Compensation Committee containing the manipulated grant 
date reflecting the low stock price.  Olesnyckyj then caused Monster to illegally misrepresent in 
its periodic filings and proxy statements that all stock options were granted at the fair market 
value on the date of the award.177  
The SEC estimates that in backdating options, "Monster granted undisclosed 
compensation to its employees, failed to recognize compensation expenses, and overstated its net 
income by $340 million from 1997 through 2005."178  Olesnyckyj is charged with violating the 
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 
                                                 
174 Id. See also See Complaint, SEC v. Roberts, No. 07-CV-00407. 
175 S.E.C. v. Olesnyckyj, Civ. A. No. 07 CV 1176 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2007).  
176 See Complaint, S.E.C. v. Olesnyckyj, Civ. A. No. 07 CV 1176, at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20004.pdf.  
177 SEC Charges Former General Counsel of Monster Worldwide, Inc. for Role in Options Backdating Scheme, 
Litigation Release No. 20004 (Feb. 15, 2007) at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20004.htm 
[hereinafter Monster Worldwide Litigation Release]. 
178 Id.  
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and Rule 10b-5) and with violating or aiding and abetting the violation of Monster's reporting 
requirements (in contravention of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rules 14a-3 
and 14a-9).179  
The SEC is seeking "permanent injunctive relief, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, civil 
monetary penalties, and an officer and director bar."180  The fact that Olesnyckyj was an attorney 
who committed these frauds is particularly reprehensible as he violated both his duty to the 
organization and the ethical duties of his profession.  Because of this, the legal community must 
take note of his punishment and not only limit their own bad acts but make efforts to actively 
dissuade their clients and colleagues from engaging in similar frauds.    
iii. S.E.C. v. Landmann & Gerhardt (Engineered Support Systems, 
Incorporated)  
 
 The SEC has also recently filed charges against Gary C. Gerhardt, former Chief Financial 
Officer, and Steven J. Landmann, former Controller, of Engineered Support Systems, 
Incorporated.  The SEC alleged that Gerhardt and Landmann "participated in a six-year 
fraudulent options backdating scheme in which they granted undisclosed, in the money stock 
options to themselves and to other Engineered Support officers, employees, and directors."181   
The SEC alleged that Engineered Support employees and directors received 
approximately $20 million in unauthorized compensation as a result of the illegal backdating.182  
                                                 
179 Complaint, Olesnyckyj, Civ. A. No. 07 CV 1176. 
180 Monster Worldwide Litigation Release, supra note 177.  See also Complaint, Olesnyckyj, Civ. A. No. 07 CV 
1176. 
181 SEC Files Actions Against Former CFO and Former Controller of Engineered Support Systems, Inc. Relating to 
Options Backdating Scheme; Former Controller Consents to Permanent Injunction, Officer-and-Director Bar, and 
Payment of $886,557, Litigation Release No. 19990 (Feb. 6, 2007) at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr19990.htm [hereinafter Engineered Support Systems Litigation 
Release].  See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Landmann, Civ. A. No. 4:07-CV-270 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 6, 2007); Complaint, S.E.C. v. 
Gerhardt, Civ. A. No. 4:07-CV-271 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 6, 2007). 
182 Complaint, S.E.C. v. Landmann, Civ. A. No. 4:07-CV-270 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 6, 2007), at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp19990sjl.pdf; Complaint, S.E.C. v. Gerhardt, Civ. A. No. 4:07-
CV-271 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 6, 2007), at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp19990gcg.pdf.  
 47
From 1997 through 2002, Gerhardt is said to have ordered Landmann to backdate the company's 
option grants to "coincide with historically low closing prices of Engineered Support's common 
stock."183  Further, it is alleged that these two caused the company to misrepresent in its financial 
and proxy statements filed with the SEC that all of the stock options had been granted at the fair 
market value of the stock on the date of the award.184 
Gerhardt is charged with violating Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Sections 
10(b), 13(b)(5), and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, and Rules 10b-5, 13a-14, 13b2-1, 
13b2-2, and 14a-9 thereunder, and with aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a), 
13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rules 13a-1, 13a-13, and 12b-
20 thereunder.185  The SEC is seeking a "permanent injunction, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, 
including prejudgment interest, civil penalties, and a bar from serving as an officer or director of 
any public company."186 
Unlike Gerhardt, Landmann has already "consented to a permanent injunction from 
violating and/or aiding and abetting violations of the antifraud, proxy statement, reporting, 
record-keeping, and the false statements to auditors' provisions of the federal securities laws."187   
Additionally, Landmann will pay disgorgement of $518,972, prejudgment interest of $108,099, 
and a civil penalty of $259,486, will be permanently barred from serving as an officer or director 
                                                 
183 Engineered Support Systems Litigation Release, supra note 181 (in addition, the complaints allege that Gerhardt 
ordered Landmann to cancel previously issued options that had fallen out of the money and to reissue them with new 
backdated grant dates and exercise prices, to bring them back in the money). 
184 Id. 
185 Complaint, Gerhardt, Civ. A. No. 4:07-CV-271.  
186 Engineered Support Systems Litigation Release, supra note 181. 
187 Id. ("Specifically, Landmann has consented to be enjoined from violating Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 
Sections 10(b), 13(b)(5), and 14(a) of the Exchange Act, and Rules 10b-5, 13b2-1, 13b2-2, and 14a-9 thereunder, 
and from aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act and 
Rules 13a-1, 13a-13, and 12b-20 thereunder.").  
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of a public company, and will be permanently suspended from appearing or practicing before the 
Commission as an accountant.188  
It is likely that Landmann's agreement will serve as a strong precedent in settling cases 
out of court.  It is especially notable that Landmann's penalty will be paid by him personally, as 
opposed to the organization.  Additionally, Landmann will suffer as he can no longer work in his 
chosen profession.  The imposition of these personal monetary penalties and bar as an accountant 
are significant enough to deter many professionals from pursuing corporate frauds in the future.   
It is likely that most, if not all, of the cases that the SEC is bringing will settle before 
court in order to limit potential judgments as well as the possibility of being made an "example" 
for other offenders.  However, without fully litigating such an action, the deterrent effects that 
the SEC should hope to obtain are limited.   
4. Other Consequences  
The focus of litigation to date has generally been on the executive sponsoring, issuing, 
and benefiting from the allegedly offending options.  Other groups that should be held 
accountable are the attorneys and auditors who were consulted about the structure and disclosure 
of the illegal options programs.  
a. Attorney liability  
 It is unclear why attorneys have escaped much of the scrutiny up to this point.  Some 
avoidance of responsibility may be due to the limited grounds on which attorneys may be held 
liable as aiders and abettors.  This is not to say that attorneys have not been held responsible in 
some situations.  Many organizations have required the resignation of general counsel.189  
                                                 
188 Id. (the settlement is subject to approval by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri).  
189 Allen & Mishra, supra note 74, at 5.  E.g., Barasch et al., supra note 2 (McAfee fired its general counsel after its 
investigation into option timing). 
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However, attorneys should be held accountable for illegal options backdating in many additional 
instances.  
Attorneys should be liable for faulty advice that leads to, or allows the continuation of, 
illegal options backdating.  "It is the failure adequately to disclose, properly account for, and pay 
taxes as a result of such programs that can transform a permissible method of compensation into 
a violation of law."190  Further, "[c]orporate counsel have a special role to fill in ensuring the 
integrity of U.S. financial markets ... [w]hen they fail in that role, they not only do a disservice to 
their companies' shareholders, they fail as members of the bar."191 
Attorneys often play an integral role in the development and implementation of a 
company's stock option plan as these require "detailed analysis of corporate legal structure, 
securities law considerations, employee benefits concerns, executive compensation issues, 
complex tax rules and disclosure obligations."192  Attorneys should be held both criminally liable 
(for their part in the falsification of books, records, and reports) and civilly liable (for their 
breach of duties, misstatements, and falsification of records and reports) where they have 
assisted with, or had knowledge of, illegal backdating in circumstances such as failure to make 
accurate or adequate disclosures and inaccurate stock option grant dating procedures. 
It is likely that attorneys will be blamed by those who are facing litigation in connection 
with illegal options backdating.  A charged executive will likely defend himself by "explaining 
that their intent was to provide a lawful compensation mechanism to reward and incentivize their 
managers for superior performance in the best interests of the company and its shareholders" and 
                                                 
190 Attorney and Auditor Potential Liability for Options Backdating. MCDERMOTT NEWSLETTERS (McDermott, Will 
& Emery), Aug. 11, 2006, at http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/ab10cb18-
72f2-44ae-a5ce-24e86002a1e0.cfm. 
191 William F. Sorin, supra note 154.  
192 MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY, supra note 190. 
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that any illegalities were due to the attorney's inadequate implementation of such a plan.193  It 
should be expected that the SEC and DOJ will bring more causes of action against attorneys for 
both criminal and civil liability.  Additionally, private litigants' (such as shareholders) will bring 
claims against these professionals for negligence or intentionally wrongful conduct.   
Overall, attorneys involved in illegal options backdating should expect to face charges.  It 
is imperative that all illegal options practices stop and holding general counsel liable will lend to 
the deterrent effect.  
b. Auditor liability 
 Auditors, like attorneys, have escaped much of the initial spotlight in illegal options 
backdating.  However, auditors should be held both criminally and civilly liable for allowing or 
participating in the illegal acts.  A company's auditor often provides advice concerning issuance 
of stock options and related tax ramifications, and reviews the financial statements.  If any of the 
auditor's advice leads to the creation or perpetuation of an illegal of stock option plan then the 
auditor should be held accountable.   
 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has stated that auditors should be 
aware that "'[q]uantitatively small misstatements may be material when they relate to unlawful 
acts,' and that under certain circumstances, such unlawful acts may trigger auditors' obligations 
under Securities Exchange Act § 10A to report 'illegal acts' to the SEC."194  Ultimately, auditors 
should be held accountable for their falsification of financial statements as well as for when they 
allow executives to continue with illegal options backdating practices.  
 
                                                 
193 Id. 
194 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1957 n.10 (quoting Matters Related to Timing and Accounting for Option Grants, 
PCAOB STAFF AUDIT PRACTICE ALERT No. 1 (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, July 28, 2006), at 
http://www.pcaobus.org/News_and_Events/News/2006/07-28_Release.pdf).  
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 5. Analysis of the various penalties 
 
In order to create the reform that the practice of options backdating requires, under the 
first prong of the proposed solution blame must be assessed on everyone who participates in the 
illegality.  If some members of an organization are able to escape liability, the deterrent effect is 
reduced.   
In addition to the necessity of holding everyone who participates in illegal options 
backdating accountable, it is necessary that these violators are punished to the full extent of the 
law.  These people have violated numerous laws, often at the expense of the shareholder who 
loses value in the stock of the corporation as it declines after restating financials and 
announcements of backdating.   
Only when the DOJ, SEC, the states, and even shareholders force responsibility through 
litigation will the illegalities cease.  At this stage, both the DOJ and the SEC need to make 
examples out of the cases that they have pending.  Instead of entering lesser charges in plea 
bargaining, these cases should be brought to trial.  The publicity that surrounds such would hold 
essential deterrent effects in and of itself.  Reform is often required after the public becomes 
aware of the inequities occurring in corporations.  Further, harsh criminal and civil penalties that 
are public record will serve to deter individual misconduct in the future.  
Ultimately, it is the criminal penalties that hold the most potential for punishment, and, 
therefore, will prove to be the most essential catalyst for change.  The DOJ and the SEC have 
limited resources that are available to pursue options backdating cases.  Because of this, 
numerous violators are "going free." This is unacceptable.  Resources must be allocated to 
punish this injustice.  It is only once people fear the penalties that they will curb their actions.  
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 The SEC is attempting to punish and deter.  It has over 100 open investigations, and any 
number of these will probably result in criminal and civil case filings soon.  As new charges are 
brought, the government should punish all violations, large and small.  In those cases where the 
individual did not knowingly violate the law or deceptively cover up their activities, where 
individuals lacked an understanding of the accounting and tax rules involved in option grants, 
where they relied on professionals to alert them to potential compliance issues, and where 
problems stemmed from inadequate formalities in options practices, charges must still be 
pursued, although the penalties may be lesser.  Perhaps a standard fine structure could be 
implemented to punish these "small" violations efficiently.  This would both promote the justice 
and efficiency that the SEC and the DOJ require. 
 Shareholder derivative suits play an essential role in the deterrent effect of illegal 
practices.  The shareholders of many corporations have lost significant value in their stock due to 
illegal backdating practices.  By forcing those who unjustly encouraged, enacted and profited 
from these acts to repay the organization, not only do the shareholders and the corporation itself 
benefit, but the market as a whole benefits.  Trust and stability is restored to the market when the 
investing public feels as though injustices acted upon the organizations in which they invest will 
not be tolerated.   
At this initial stage of enforcement against illegal options backdating the justice system is 
not doing enough to create a deterrent effect.  In order to create the reform that the practice of 
options backdating requires, blame must be assessed on everyone who participated in the 
illegality.  If some members of an organization are able to escape liability, the deterrent effect is 
reduced.  Although top executives are the only ones being held liable at this stage, accountability 
should be extended to company attorneys and auditors, compensation committees, boards of 
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directors, and, perhaps, the company itself.  Further, all avenues of liability should be pursued, 
both civil and criminal charges should be brought by the DOJ and SEC, and shareholders must 
continue to hold violators accountable.  
III.  OPTIONS BACKDATING TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE 
 
 The present causes of action that are available may not be enough to stop future 
backdating violations nor to stop other corporate frauds.  They are not a sufficient deterrent 
against future illegal acts.  Under the first prong of the proposed solution, the SEC and DOJ must 
bring charges against everyone who participated and promoted illegal options backdating, not 
just the company's top executives.  Additionally, shareholders must hold their organizations 
liable.  Attorneys, auditors, compensation committees and entire boards, where appropriate, 
should be charged.  At this initial stage it may be most effective to include the entity itself in any 
litigation.195  By assessing blame on all of those who were involved, directors and other officials 
will stop "rubberstamping" proposals and instead begin to be more actively involved in the 
organization and the matters at hand.  We must hold these people accountable in order to deter 
them in the future.   
Under the second prong of the proposed two-part solution, uniform option grant 
requirements must be established.  This second prong requires the creation of a uniform scheme 
for option granting going forward.  Organizations would be required to set options grants and 
related reporting to occur on the same date each year.  Such a requirement would make options 
grants more transparent.  In creating such as scheme, enforcement agencies and the public are 
able to more effectively monitor the grant process for potential illegalities.  This ability to 
                                                 
195 This might be an inappropriate remedy as shareholders who did not profit from many illegal grants would be 
forced to accept decreased share value as the company fights the litigation and pays any damages.  However, in 
situations where the company did not accurately account for options, to the benefit of the company (and thus the 
shareholder's value in the company) litigation against the organization may be appropriate.   
 54
monitor the process will leave minimal room for violations to go unnoticed.  Additionally, by 
streamlining the option grant process, automatic penalties would be feasible, making punishment 
easier and more efficient, adding to the deterrent effect.   
This two-prong solution of deterrence and effective regulations creates a system where 
potential violators have a limited opportunity to violate the law and where they fear the potential 
consequences of any possible violations.  
A. The Two-Part Solution  
 1. The crackdown must continue 
 Lie and Heron's study estimated that 23% of unscheduled, at the money options grants to 
top executives between 1996 and August 2002 were backdated or otherwise manipulated.196  
"This fraction was roughly halved as a result of the new two day reporting requirement that took 
effect in August 2002."197  However, illegal backdating practices continue.   
Many companies avoid obligations and file grant reports late.   In these late reports the 
"prevalence of backdating is roughly the same as before August 2002."198   This study illustrates 
the need to continue regulations and to continue to hold organizations and individuals liable for 
illegal backdating.  The practice of filing grant reports late is unacceptable.  Significant fines 
should be imposed to deter organizations from late reports.199  Until all possible avenues are 
closed that enable a company to participate in illegal backdating, justice is not being served.  
This is a simple and efficient way to promote trust in the marketplace.   
                                                 
196 Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top Executives Have Been Backdated or 
Manipulated? (Nov. 1, 2006) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/Grants%2011-01-2006.pdf [hereinafter Heron & Lie, Fraction of Stock 
Option Grants]. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. ("the fraction of grants that are filed late is estimated to be approximately 13%).  
199 Obviously, fines should be great enough that a company is dissuaded from engaging in any illegal activity.  The 
fine must be larger than any gains the company may receive from deceptive accounting and reporting. 
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Under the first prong of the proposed solution charges must be assessed against everyone 
who participated in illegal options backdating.  By assessing blame on all of those who were 
involved, directors and other officials will fear consequences and more actively avoid potential 
corporate frauds.  We must hold these people accountable in order to deter them in the future.   
While stock option backdating is a practice in which (generally) companies no longer 
engage, the restatement and investigation process and the pending civil and criminal charges 
will, and must, continue.  Additionally, the media frenzy surrounding illegal backdating currently 
assists in the public shaming of involved organizations and officials.  The threat of a tarnished 
reputation for the company and its executives may alone serve as one of the most effective 
deterrents and prompt further reform.  
 2. Structural Changes  
The second portion of the proposed solution seeks to alleviate the strain on the resources 
of the SEC and DOJ.  This prong would require companies to adopt a fixed date for all option 
grants and related disclosures.  This date would be the same from year to year, allowing for 
regulators and the investing public to promptly recognize violations.  This creates a transparent 
option granting system where no leeway is left for backdating; the price of the stock on the date 
of the grant would be clearly ascertainable.   
Under this proposal, executives who are awarded options will receive a promise to grant 
such options on the fixed grant date.  Any loss in value to the employee that occurs due to the 
wait can be provided in the form of a cash bonus.  This fixed date will allow an organization to 
obtain the requisite approvals and finalize administrative work in advance, eliminating the 
inadvertent delays that were one of the alleged causes of past violations. Setting a fixed date will 
prevent the significant costs and penalties associated with later discoveries of inadvertent tax 
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and/or accounting violations from inaccurate reports.  There will be no need for restatements.  
Additionally, there will be no question as to whether an organization allows for backdating as 
such will be uniformly prohibited.  
The requirement for a fixed option grant date could be implemented in a number of 
different ways.  The SEC should create disclosure requirements that a uniform date be set and 
disclosed.  The tax code should be amended to require that a fixed date be set in order to receive 
the performance-based incentives that are afforded to option grants.  The stock exchanges can 
require a fixed date in order to be listed on the index.  State legislatures can amend state 
corporate laws to reflect this requirement.  Similarly, shareholders should petition the legislatures 
to enact these requirements and petition the organizations themselves to amend the bylaws and 
articles of incorporation to reflect a fixed option date requirement.   
Violations of the fixed date or reporting requirements would be punished through the 
imposition automatic fines.  This would alleviate the strain on the SEC's resources as penalties 
would be automatic.  The DOJ would also experience these benefits as the potential to violate 
options grant procedures would be restricted, limiting the number of criminal charges that would 
need to be brought.  The establishment of uniform option grant dates will also deter future 
violations as organizations will not want to be assessed penalties for violations, significantly 
assisting the SEC's and DOJ's limited resources.   
3.  Regulatory Controls   
Additional regulatory controls already in effect attempt to deter illegal backdating.  
Unfortunately, the SEC has attempted to take the focus off of the violators by publicly stating 
that the SEC believes that option misconduct is not likely to be a significant problem going 
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forward.  By devaluing the enormity of this problem, violations will continue and litigation will 
be less likely to occur to limit such illegal acts.  
SEC Chairman Cox stated that the changes that have taken place since the enactment of 
Sarbanes-Oxley have "'effectively slammed the door shut on . . . secretive option grants,' and that 
'almost all of the stock option abuses . . . started in periods prior to these reforms.'"200  
Additionally, changes in NYSE and NASDAQ listing standards in 2003 requiring shareholder 
approval of equity compensation plans and the issuance, on July 26, 2006, of SEC compensation 
rules that require fuller disclosure of options grants have been said to have assisted in the 
"elimination" illegal options backdating.  As previously mentioned, these standards could be 
further amended to reflect the second part of the proposed solution, a fixed option grant date 
requirement.  Although these procedures and rules do assist in the decline of illegal options 
backdating, the practice continues.  Public statements that minimalize the issue hurt the reform 
process.  If people believe that there is no problem, they stop looking for such.  This is exactly 
how so many options grants went unnoticed initially.  We are not doing enough when we 
publicly minimize the problem.   
  a. SEC regulations and reforms 
 The SEC has attempted to effectuate controls to limit an organization's ability to engage 
in illegal options backdating.  The SEC recently released new executive compensation disclosure 
rules that "seek to make option grant practices transparent, and single out for explanation 
practices such as making grants immediately before a positive announcement, or immediately 
                                                 
200 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1962 (quoting Cox, Congressional Testimony, supra note 163).   
These comments are ironic considering the public outcry relating to option backdating.  Cox also stated in this 
testimony that in the 72 years of the Commission's history no issue has generated as much interest.   
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after a negative one."201  The new rules "require companies, in their compensation discussion and 
analysis (CD&A), to discuss practices regarding the timing and pricing of stock option grants, 
including practices of selecting option grant dates for executive officers in coordination with the 
release of material, nonpublic information; the timing of option grants to executive officers in 
relation to option grants to employees generally; the role of the compensation committee and the 
executive officers in determining the timing of option grants; and the formula used to set the 
exercise price of an option grant."202  
 The SEC's rules are a strong attempt at reform of the entire options granting practice.  
The new rules better assist others in identifying when options are not at the money grants.  
However, the SEC did not formally address the accounting for options where backdating is 
involved.  As noted, the second prong of the proposed solution would solidify accounting and 
reporting procedures by setting a fixed date for options to be granted (therefore limiting the 
possible accounting ambiguities that exist when a date must be "selected").  These regulations do 
assist in the creation of a system that requires accountability, thus limiting the desire to violate 
the law.  A fixed grant date would further these aims.  By forcing disclosure in periodic reports 
and proxy statements an organization is inhibited from hiding illegal practices.  Further, if they 
do not report required information, liability will be imposed.  The clearer the standards, the less 
"wiggle room" organizations will have to violate the law.  The SEC must clearly set forth what 
acceptable practices are and then punish those who deviate from them.  
 Additionally, the SEC has imposed substantial civil penalty payments on organizations 
that have been found to have engaged in illegal options backdating.  These civil penalties have a 
                                                 
201 Brower et al., supra note 83, at 1.  See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Comm'n, SEC Votes to Adopt 
Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Matters (July 26, 2006) at 
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substantial and significant deterrent effect, effectuating the first prong of the proposed two-part 
solution.  The imposition of fines is one of the top deterrents available and should be used more 
rigorously against violators.  The SEC and Mercury Interactive Corporation recently settled a 
backdating violation for a $35 million fine.203  It is this kind of significant penalty that serves as 
a deterrent.  Organizations that consider engaging in illegal practices will be deterred by multi-
million dollar penalties imposed on other organizations.  This effect extends beyond the options 
grant practice.  It allows for a sense of fear to be instilled in a corporation for there is proof that 
large penalties will be imposed.  Although there is no way to determine whether Mercury's fine 
will be considered a benchmark in backdating cases, it is still very significant and will likely be 
considered in future settlements.   
 Unfortunately, concern that fines imposed on organizations will ultimately come out of 
the pockets of the company's shareholders has limited the SEC's desire to hold the company itself 
liable.  As previously noted, so long as fines are imposed on organizations that have been 
unjustly enriched by their violations of reporting, accounting and tax violations then the 
shareholders are not unjustly punished.  Instead, the organization is forced to pay for ill-gotten 
gains.  The potential for decreased stock value simply reflects the opposite of any increases that 
may have been caused by the illegality.  The bad publicity and shareholder distaste for such 
organizations will serve as a very significant deterrence to illegal activities in the future.  It is for 
this reason that organizations should be held directly accountable by the SEC.  
  b. PCAOB 
 Another agency that is currently attempting to limit the possibility of illegal options 
granting is the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).  In July 2006, the 
PCAOB "issued guidance requiring auditors to review more carefully company option grant 
                                                 
203 Crimmins, supra note 41, at 1958 (citing Mercury Interactive Corp., Form 10-K., filed Oct. 5, 2006, p. 33-34).  
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practices."204  This requirement "will substantially increase the scrutiny of option granting 
practices...."205  By identifying that a problem exists and defining the standards that auditors are 
to use in their handling of such issues the PCAOB has reformed options granting practices by 
limiting potential ways in which violations could go unnoticed or undocumented or when 
company procedures are inadequate or inappropriate.  Additionally, by implementing the 
proposed fixed date requirement, accountants will be further shielded from potential violations. 
The stricter requirements for auditors serve as deterrence both for auditors who do not want to be 
held liable for an organization's violations as well as for companies themselves as they will be 
less likely to violate laws when others will be double-checking their procedures and actions.  
4. Internal company controls 
 The prevention and correction of illegal option granting cannot be left exclusively to the 
government.  There are a number of things that an organization should implement in order to 
avoid illegal activities.  By encouraging organizations to hold themselves and their boards, 
executives, attorneys, and auditors accountable, faith in the organization (and the market) is 
revived.  
 Companies should take steps to enact certain procedural safeguards to ensure, not only 
that there will be no illegal backdating, but that there will be no appearance of impropriety either.  
Under the proposed solution, companies should grant options on the same date each year, 
regardless of whether or not such is required by law.  They should set strict guidelines as to how 
the exercise price will be determined on this date, modify the terms of the company's 
                                                 
204  WEIL BRIEFING, supra note 1, at 2. See Matters Relating to the Timing and Accounting for Option Grants, STAFF 
AUDIT PRACTICE ALERT NO. 1 (PCAOB, July 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.pcaobus.org/Standards/Staff_Questions_and_Answers/2006/07-28_APA_1.pdf. See generally SEC and 
PCAOB Provide Guidance on Disclosure, Timing and Accounting for Stock Option Grants, CLIENT ALERT 
(Akerman Senterfitt), Aug. 2, 2006, at 
http://www.akerman.com/documents/Client%20Alert_Stock%20Option%20Grants_8_06.pdf. 
205 BLANK ROME LLP, supra note 27.  
 61
compensation plan to state that backdating is not acceptable, require shareholder approval of the 
company compensation plan, limit the ability of the compensation committee to change grant 
practices and dates, require strict compliance with accounting and tax guidelines and 
recommendations, assure the independence of the compensation committee, and require proper 
and detailed documentation of all grants. 
 By enacting internal controls, individuals within the organization will be unable to break 
the law and subject the organization to potential liability.  Further, investor relations will be 
strengthened as there will be no fear of undisclosed compensation or future liability.  
5.  Executives illegalities continue 
 The fact that some executives continue to violate options backdating rules and regulations 
is proof that we are not doing enough.  We must enact and enforce strong deterrents and 
regulations that eliminate illegal backdating.  Until organizations and executives fear the 
consequences of misconduct, they will continue to seek easy gains by breaking the rules.   
 Not only are individuals continuing to illegally backdate option grants, as mentioned 
above, but they are relying on alternative deceptive practices to line their pockets.  Bullet 
dodging and spring loading options are becoming more apparent.  By awarding options after the 
release of negative information that causes the company's stock to decline in value or before the 
release of good news that is expected to increase the company's stock value, a director violates 
his fiduciary duty to the company.  These actions are becoming more prevalent because there are 
no deterrents against them.  The SEC has suggested that it will limit itself to cases where options 
were backdated and will not pursue spring loading and bullet dodging cases.206  Statements such 
as this have the effect of authorizing the deceptive and potentially illegal practices that they do 
not punish.  By setting a fixed grant date, these "alternative" deceptive grant practices would also 
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be eliminated.  This secondary effect of eliminating corporate frauds in addition to illegal 
backdating makes the second prong of the proposed solution so important. 
 It is imperative that we punish all misconduct relating to options grants to the full extent 
of the law.  These questionable stock option grant practices harm the shareholder, the company, 
and the markets.  Until officials and organizations fear punishment these acts will continue.    
B.  Implications for the Future 
 The question that is raised at this initial stage in the investigations and publicity relating 
to illegal options backdating is "what now"?  The illegal conduct has rocked corporate America 
and significantly decreased recognized profits at a number of top organizations.  The public 
outcry has been strong.  This deceptive conduct will not be tolerated.  Unfortunately, due to the 
novelty of the situation, the difficulty and expense in discovering violations, the limited 
resources available for enforcement and prosecution of violations, and the time delay in 
enforcement actions that are currently before the courts, the deterrent effect that is necessary to 
prevent future misconduct is limited.  This is why a fixed grant date must been required.  Not 
until the mechanisms to prevent illegal grant practices are established will the illegal acts stop.   
 As the investigations continue and publicity soars, the SEC, DOJ, the media, and the 
investing community will certainly uncover many more violations. As more violations are 
uncovered we will be able to learn exactly how organizations perpetrated this fraud and, 
therefore, become more able to recognizing similar misconduct.  Additionally, as stricter rules 
and regulations are promulgated in response to the illegalities (such as uniform option grant date 
requirements) there will be less room for questionable practices by organizations and their 
executives.  Additionally, as the prosecutions continue and increase in number, as well as the 
publicity involved in such high-profile cases, the deterrent effects will become apparent.  Fewer 
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individuals will risk severe punishment and high civil fines and organizations themselves will 
not tolerate such. 
 Unfortunately, it is unlikely that we will "catch" all the violators due to the cost of 
investigation and the difficulty in identifying illegal acts (as well as the extreme difficulty in 
proving some of these violations).207  Those violators that are caught must be prosecuted and 
precedent set.  A signal must be sent that similar behavior will be punished severely.  Companies 
must do their part by enacting measures, regardless of required regulation, and tightening 
requirements to protect themselves from liability and to prevent executives and directors from 
being able to violate the law.  Investors must demand disclosure, shareholder approved options 
plans, and fixed option grant dates.  The SEC, DOJ and other law enforcement agencies must 
allocate the additional resources that are required to enforce improved disclosure practices for 
options grants and to enact and enforce laws and regulations.   
CONCLUSION 
 Most people would agree that illegal option grant practices should not be tolerated.  With 
the severe consequences to the organizations themselves, their shareholders, and the market as a 
whole, the past violations must be punished and future violations prevented.  As the government, 
investors and the organizations themselves demand accuracy and disclosure.  
The proposed two-prong solution limits the future implications of options backdating and 
similar illegalities.  The first prong requires the forceful pursuit of punishment of violations in 
order to create a strong deterrent effect.  At this initial stage of the investigations into illegal 
options backdating the justice system is not doing enough to stop these corporate frauds.  In 
order to create the reform that the practice of options backdating requires, blame must be 
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assessed on everyone who participated in the illegal acts and uniform grant date requirements 
must be enacted.  If some members of an organization are able to escape liability, the deterrent 
effect is reduced. Although top executives are the only ones being held liable at this stage, 
accountability should be extended to company attorneys and auditors, compensation committees, 
boards of directors, and, perhaps, the company itself.   
The second prong creates a uniform scheme for option granting going forward.  By 
requiring organizations to set options grants to occur on the same date each year, enforcement 
agencies and the public are able to more effectively monitor the grant process for potential 
illegalities.  This ability to monitor the process will ensure that violations such as this do not 
occur in the future.  Additionally, by streamlining the process, automatic penalties would be 
feasible, making punishment easier and more efficient, adding to the deterrent effect.  This two-
prong solution of deterrence and effective regulations will create a system where potential 
violators have limited opportunity to violate the law and where they fear the potential 
consequences of any possible violations.  
In order to put an end to this practice the DOJ, SEC, and shareholders must continue to 
pursue charges against violators.  Precedent must be set and efficient regulations enacted that 
truly work as deterrents.  The more severe the charges and the higher the potential fines, the less 
likely executives and organizations will continue illegal option grant practices.  The more 
difficult it is for an individual to violate the law, the less frequently it will occur.  The proposed 
two-prong solution will substantially assist in putting an end to illegal backdating.   
